File 2764/1904 Pt 3 'Baghdad Railway: general negotiations 1910-1912.' [‎212r] (434/544)

J
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic
BAGDAD RAILWAY.
SECRET.
[27275]
[Amended Copt.]
No. 1.
Minute by Mr. Parker.
It v/ I | " " { 1
Majesty's faovemment.]
[July 27.]
Section 2.
on jDjavid Bey to-day, and discussed with him the questions of the
Bagdad Kadway and Turkish customs increase.
I began by saying that His Majesty s Government were genuinely anxious to meet
the Ottoman Government by assenting to the 4 per cent, customs increase, but they
were deterred by the knowledge that any such increase would, either directly or
indirectly, facilitate the progress of the Bagdad Railway, an enterprise which, if carried
out according to the Convention of 1903, would not in our opinion serve the best
interests of Turkey, while it could not fail to inflict enduring injury on the commerco
of Great Britain. The upshot _ of the situation was, therefore, that His Majesty’s
Government could not give their assent to the customs increase if the Convention of
1903 remained unchanged in force.
In support of the view that the Convention of 1903 was not favourable to Turkey,
I handed to Djavid Bey the annexed aide-memoire ; in support of the contention that
the advent of the Bagdad Railway under German auspices would inflict damage on
British trade, I urged that the railway would constitute a virtual monopoly of the
means of communication in Mesopotamia, while the concession conferred upon the
Germans important subsidiary rights which tended to establish a monopoly of
the economic exploitation of the country.
Djavid Bey concurred in this estimate of the Concession of 1903, both in so far
as it affected Turkish and British interests : he said that his wish was to find an
equitable solution of these very difficulties, and he frankly admitted that such a
solution was not possible unless the Convention of 1903, in so far as it related to the
Bagdad-Gulf sections, was fundamentally modified.
He then said that he intended to visit Berlin after leaving London, his object being
to. induce the Germans to agree to a satisfactory modification; it was true that this
might be difficult to bring about, but the Turkish Government had means of retaliation
in regard to other German interests in Turkey, and he was not prepared to regard the
effort he was about to make at Berlin as foredoomed to failure. What, he said, was
important at the moment was that he should ascertain precisely what solution would be
accepted by His Majesty’s Government, and before discussing the subject he would
emphasise the fact that the Ottoman Government did not wish to have two distinct
railways built between Bagdad and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .
It appeared to him that there were two alternative modifications which might meet
the situation :—either (1) the Turkish Government themselves should construct and
subsequently control the railway between Bagdad and the Gulf; or (2) that portion
of the Bagdad Railway should be internationalised in such a manner that Turkey
would receive 25 per cent., Great Britain 25 per cent., Germany 25 per cent., and
France 25 per cent., the president being a Turk.
I said that before replying I should like it to be understood that any observations I
made must be regarded as tentative, since I obviously had no authority to commit His
Majesty’s Government in any way, and the object of my visit was merely to discuss the
subject in order, if possible, to discover a basis of negotiation.
To me the first alternative named appeared to be the more feasible from the point
of view of British interests, while the second was hardly likely to be approved by
public opinion in this country as a sufficient quid pro quo for British assent to the
customs increase. I would, however, submit the two alternative suggestions which he
had made.
I then said that, assuming that the first alternative were accepted in principle,
I should like to know what it would involve: Would the Ottoman Government
permanently control the railway when completed ; would they guarantee that British
merchandise should not be subjected to adverse manipulation of rates; would they
he able to ensure equality of treatment for goods of British origin on the sections of the
railway west of Bagdad; would they give to British railway contractors, e.g., the
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