File 2764/1904 Pt 3 'Baghdad Railway: general negotiations 1910-1912.' [‎213r] (436/544)

political one, since it would constitute not improbably the quickest route to India, and
the question was one in which finance and policy were closely bound up. He begged
that the question of this country constructing the terminal port might be left out of
consideration ; but I rejoined that if His Majesty’s Government agreed to the 4 per
^ent. and only insisted that Turkey herself, and not Great Britain, should control the
< une between^ Bagdad and the Gulf, the least we could expect from the Turkish
Government in return for the great concession we were making with regard to the
customs increase, would be that Turkey should allow Great Britain to construct and
control the port at Koweit: for myself, I felt sure that it would be quite impossible to
satisfy British public opinion short of this, and it would be impossible to defend our
assent to the customs increase.
Djavid said that the question of Koweit was political, and it should not be brought
into discussion. I replied that for two hundred years we had had relations of amity with
the Sheikh of Koweit, •' a nd^t hat we possessed, as the Turkish Government Were aware,
great influence with him//now, recognising that the question of Koweit could not be
separated from that of the Bagdad Hallway, we wished to regularise the situation there
by coming to an agreement of cordial co-operation with the Turkish Government; and
I confessed frankly that 1 saw little hope of the assent of His Majesty’s Government to
the 4 per cent, being arranged unless we could come to an agreement that the terminus
of the railway should be at Koweit under the conditions explained.
In conclusion, I promised Djavid that he should have a written memorandum as to
the attitude of His Majesty’s Government.
Suggestions.
I think that the best mode of procedure is to draw up a statement for Djavid,
saying that we are anxious to agree to the 4 per cent, on terms which would be accept
able to Turkey, and that we fully appreciate his disinclination to see her consent coupled
with conditions, since this might lead to further conditions being made by other
Powers.
If therefore, when he returns from Berlin, he is able to announce that the German
Government have agreed to Turkey building and permanently controlling the line
between Bagdad and the Gulf, and if he is able to give us an informal assurance as to
the several points indicated on p. 3 (paragraph 2) of this minute, we should be prepared
to agree to the 4 per cent, for a period of four years, (till 1914 when the 3 per cent, would
come to an end), but that we should expect the terminus to be at Koweit and the
port there to be constructed by us, and such foreign control as existed to be British, and
that if, at the end of four years, we found that the conditions on the part of Turkey had
not been fulfilled, then we should have to withdraw our assent not only from the 4 per
cent., but also from the 3 per cent., which has only been agreed to till.1914.
I think this is the utmost we can safely do without having conditions in the form of
an agreement, such as Djavid objects to.
I think the point about Koweit is a most important one; and if we do not have
the terminus there we shall also have been spending our money for nothing.
A. P.
Foreign Office, July 27, 1910.
There is the further condition we desire to make about the removal of the restriction
on the borrowing powers of Egypt. If the Turks wish this could be done by a firman A Persian word meaning a royal order or decree issued by a sovereign, used notably in the Ottoman Empire (sometimes written ‘phirmaund’).
issued on the day we agree to the customs increase, or by a note to us.
-A.. Jr.
C. H.
It will be recalled that we pay 4,000Z. a-year to the Sheikh for the lease of land
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