Coll 30/18(1) 'Persian Gulf: Bahrein, Customs dues on goods in transit; attitude of Ibn Saud' [‎49r] (102/1162)

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16. tinally, the question of the Bahrein Transit Dues was raised. Fuad
Bey explained that there were two difficulties confronting his Government in
this matter: firstly, the question of the transit dues themselves; and, secondly,
^ the question of direct shipments to the Hasa coast. As regards the first of these,
the Saudi Government feared that the Bahrein Government were about to raise ^
the dues, if they had not already done so. They considered, moreover, that any
consignments addressed either to King Ibn Baud or to the Saudi Government
should be exempted from dues.
17. Sir Andrew Ryan stated that for some time past the negotiations on
this subject had been transferred to London, and that, although he had been
kept informed, he had not been directly concerned in this matter, until during
his recent audience with King Ibn Baud at Taif the King had raised with him
the question of direct shipments. He pointed out that it was scarcely fair of
the Saudi Government both to demand that the Bahrein Government should
reduce the rates of the dues and at the same time endeavour to kill the Bahrein
transit trade. Bahrein must live.
18. Mr. Rendel stated that Sheikh Hafiz Wahba had already represented
fully at the Foreign Office the views of his Government on this subject. His
Majesty’s Government, for their part, had suggested that a Saudi delegation
should be sent to Bahrein, to examine whether the issue between the Saudi and
Bahrein Governments could not be narrowed down if not removed altogether.
He suggested that this was, in fact, the most practical means of settling this
question, that the Saudi Government could not prejudice their case by sending
such a delegation, and that if the discussions should fail they would still be free
to pursue the matter with His Majesty’s Government direct. The question,
particularly as regards the dues, was a complicated and technical one, where local
data would be necessary, and which could be dealt with far more effectively on
the spot than in London or in Jedda. He felt sure that such a local meeting
would do much to clear the air, even if it did not lead to a final settlement, and
he suggested that preliminary discussions of this nature might well take place
at once. Sir A. Ryan would not be back in Jedda until December, so there was
plenty of time to explore the ground locally meanwhile. If the proposed local
discussions should lead to nothing, and the Saudi Government should have
reasonable grounds for considering the attitude of the Bahrein Government to
be unreasonable, it would still be possible to bring the matter into the scope of
the general discussions with Sir A. Ryan after his return to Jedda.
Sir Andrew Ryan stated that he had always considered Saudi Arabia and
Bahrein to be jointly interested in this matter, subject to a proviso that with the
passage of time this common interest might weaken or vanish. He had
throughout been convinced, and was still convinced, that the best method of
arriving at a solution would be that which His Majesty’s Government had
proposed, namely, a discussion at Bahrein on a purely practical basis, with the
object of arriving at an agreement which should be concluded for a limited period
of, say, five years. Such a discussion, conducted by such local experts as, say,
Mahomed at Tawil on the Saudi side, and the Financial Adviser, with the
assistance of the British Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. , on the Bahreini side, would, in his
opinion, offer every prospect of a settlement. He had again urged this solution
at Taif, but King Ibn Baud appeared to be obsessed by the feeling that His
Majesty’s Government were inclined to boycott the development of the Hasa
ports.
Mr Rendel explained that His Majesty’s Government had no wish to boycott
or blockade Hasa or to interfere with its development. But, m any case if the
Saudi Government could not obtain reasonable satisfaction at the proposed local
conference, they would still be able to raise this question during the general
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