‘File 2/32 ACQUISITION OF PERMANENT AIR FACILITIES’ [‎18r] (35/338)

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neutral territory, it would be impossible to contend that^were
"maintaining the indepandenoa of" the Sultan in accordance with the
1862 Beclarati on•" ¥he conclusion was reached however that this
difficulty wuld cipappifcr if Kuscat wei*e to beconie a belligerent,
and that it was difficult to imagine a war in which it would be
essential for Bri ti?3h forces to use Hior ^uwai without its being
equally essential fror? the point of view of major British interests
that Muscat should be induced to become a belligerent, an event *
tfiich could probably be secured without difficulty. These limit
ations on our position gave rise to no difficulty in the case of
Khor v^uwai, since all that v/as required was the use of the Island
for recreational purposes and the erection on it of a few auall
buildings etc. fha question of control over Muscat*s subjects
did not arise.
5. In the case of Katsirah, however, it ia clear that such limit
ations would not be at all in accordance with ^iiat the Air Ministry
desire, since their requirement is upccilioally for a permanent
R.A.F. base which could be used for strategical purposes (involving
presumably the construction cf defensive works) and control over
the local inhabitants. However, the situation has changed a good
deal since 1934. Xu the fir at place the French, as the Political
Resident points out, have no longer any interest whatever in
Muscat* In the second place the Foreign Office were previously
anxious about the necessity of avoiding infringi ng Muscat neutrality
in the event of war should we wish to use the Khor ^uwai depot in
war conditions. It was then assumed that the position would
Inevitably be covered by Muscat being brought in as a belligerent.
Otherwise we would, cease to use Khor (^uwai • Actually war has
come, and ttet has not been the way in tfiich things have worked out.
Muscat still remains, technically at any rate, neutral, though at
the start of the war the Sultan agreed to give us any naval or air
facilities in his territories which we might require, in return
for a subsidy and a guarantee of protection against external attack,
and a promise that he should be a party to the Peace Treaty to the
extent that, it might involve Muscat territory and Muscat interests.
The French were our allies at the beginning of the war when these
arrangements were concluded in November 1939 and it is doubtful
whether they ever knew of them at all. Whether they would have
thought fit to complain of the arrangements with the Sultan on the
score of the 1862 Declaration cannot in the circumstances be stated.
It wou3d seem in any case that we mould have justified the establish
ment of a base on Hfefireh Island (wfosre cf course the R.A.F. are
already operating) as part of our ese®itial war measures, in which
at any rate originally the French were equally interested, and
we could simply take the line with the French if they should ever
raise the point that the oirouns tances of the war had made the 1862
, Declaration obsolete, but that in any case we had not done anything
to infringe the independence of the Sultan. This is in fact the
line taken by the Goverume.it of India in their telegram Ro.2758
of the nth March, which hae now been received. If the Foreign
Office agree therefore, we might ignore ary possible difficulty
with the French arising from the 1862 Declaration. (In any case
it is very doubtful whether tne line ta^an by Lord Sailsoury in 1899
was legally correct, since it might be arguable that it was an
ijinfriugement of the Ruler’s independence to refuse to allow him to
fl!alienate or lease a portion cf hia territory if he wished to do so).
6. Assuming that this difficulty can be ignored, the Govern
ment of India suggest that we should proceed to negotiate with the
Sultan, placing the objects of our negotiations in the following
Order :-
(a) Exchange of Maslrah Island for the Kuria Muria Islands,
accompanied by canh ccmpent ati on. An exchange arrangement of this
kind wculd help to save the Sultan’s face, and might possibly be
a useful argument against French or otlxr outside cb~cations.
/ it)