Coll 28/111 ‘Persia. Kermanshah – Political diaries.’ [‎9r] (18/751)

beet crop has been lying in the open exposed to frost for a month past and
insufficient motor lorries have been available to collect the beets. Many lorries
were ready to collect the beets, but were immobilised because no tyres for them
were to be found. Sugar means so much to the population here that, should
supplies of this vital commodity run out, much discontent is bound to result, d he
^^Jame for the shortage is certain to be attributed to Britain; while this is quite
^.logical, it is almost impossible to convince the ignorant masses that, had
Germany invaded Persia, their plight would have been fiftyfold worse.
The rise in the cost of living has been meteoric during the past three months,
and there are no signs here that the Central Government has made an effort to
check this rise. On the contrary, it would seem that all-round increases have been
encouraged, for the price of even alcohol (arak) has been raised irom 11 to 15 rials
per bottle, and the price of opium, too, has been increased by the Government
during the past month.
5. Persian A dministration.
On the 5th November a Colonel Givian (who had served under General
Shahbakhti at Ahwaz) took over the military governorship here, only to
relinquish the post the next day to the natural surprise of everybody. Since his
departure the post has remained vacant, but it is announced that an “ Ustandar ’
is about to be appointed for the Vth Ustan, which includes the provinces of
Hamadan, Kermanshah, Kurdistan and Shahabad. The new Governor is
Brigadier (Sartip) Afkhami, who is expected to arrive at Kermanshah (which
will be his headquarters) on the 6th or 7th December.
General Shahbakhti has, not unnaturally, gathered around him several
military officers who have collaborated with him in the past and has piaced them
in key positions. Thus, he has as his Chief of Staff a Colonel Alp, who held a
similar position under him before coming to Kermanshah. In the same way
military officers among the general’s friends have been appointed to military
sub-governorships in various districts. It is known that Shahbakhti disapproves
of the appointment of influential landlords and tribal leaders as sub-governors of
the areas in which they have influence and this explains why Persian officers are,
as in Keza Shah’s time, continuing to exercise authority and control over rural
and tribal areas.
If the above officers were efficient and honest, no very serious objections could
be raised to their being chosen to administer the affairs of outlying districts and
of the tribal areas, but it is extremely doubtful whether the newly-appointed
officers are likely to be any better than their corrupt and inefficient predecessors.
Indeed, it has been hinted to me that General Shahbakhti himself has much the
same ideas of honesty as General Muqaddam, whom he succeeded, and that the
men whom he has recently appointed as sub-governors have paid him handsome
sums for the privilege of serving under him; these sums can only be recovered
as a result of fleecing the population in the areas under these officers’ control. If
these rumours are true—and I fear that there is some element of truth in them—
the same scandalous state of oppression and injustice is likely to reign here in
the near future as in pre-occupation days. I consider that, if the Persian Govern
ment wishes to obtain the best results in rural districts, it should appoint as
district sub-governors, persons who have an interest or a stake in the district in
question. A large landowner or tribal leader is surely not likely to impoverish
or ruin the area in which he has villages and live-stock to anything like the same
extent that a stranger might, having no interest in the district except to extract
from it the maximum amount of money possible with the minimum of delay in
order to recoup the bribes paid by him when appointed to the sub-governorship.
Until radical changes are made in the method of appointing officials, injustice
and oppression are certain to continue.
' If the population in large areas under British military occupation are, as
seems likely, to be exploited and unjustly treated now, as in the past, it is to be
feared that British prestige will be adversely affected, for our failure to prevent
abuses from taking place will be interpreted by everybody here as either {a) that
His Majesty’s Government is powerless to prevent obvious injustices and abuses;
or (5) that His Majesty’s Government is condoning a scandalous state of affairs
and is supporting local authorities who ought to be removed rather than main
tained in power.