File 200/1928 Pt 10 'Persia: Anglo-Persian Relations. Treaty Negotiations' [‎30r] (60/868)

of the two neighbours, and that anything conducing to friendly relations between
Iran and Iraq would seem to be an important factor in British policy.
Conversely, absence of a settlement between the two parties will probably recoil
on our relations with Iran, as we shall be held responsible for failure to induce
Bagdad to come to terms.
f 16. Russia is perhaps not a dangerous rival at present, and even if she were,
a policy of direct antagonism to her, however carefully concealed, would defeat
its own object. I he best insurance against dangerous competition from Russia
or any other quarter, and also the best guarantee for the protection of British
interests, is the establishment of sound relations between ourselves and this
country. It may be remarked that Russia need not be the only possible
competitor. I here have been indications of Italian ambitions, German com
mercial and cultural propaganda is active, and only a few days ago the Prime
Minister spoke to me somewhat seriously of the ultimate probability of a forward
policy by Japan which would affect this country.
17. I have left one important point to the end, being fully conscious of the
difficulties which it presents. The Prime Minister has twice since my arrival
spoken to me of the Arms Traffic question, once on the occasion of my first visit
to His Highness last January and again on the 19th June. On both occasions His
Highness laid great emphasis on the importance in Iranian eyes of being
accorded equal treatment in this as in all other matters. In general I am fully
aware that it is the intention of His Majesty’s Government to treat the Iranian
Government on terms of absolute equality, and this has only recently been
confirmed in Sir John Simon’s telegram No. 79 of the 23rd March last. The
difficulty in this case is that there exists a doubt in our minds as to the manner
in which the Iranian navy would carry out their duties in the case of vessels
under a foreign, or if full reciprocity were accorded, under the British flag. In
the light of certain experiences with Arab dhows in the past, this is entirely
comprehensible. There is also, perhaps, a feeling that it is unsuitable that
vessels flying British or foreign flags should be subjected to the possibility of
search by a unit of the Persian navy. The first objection is practical, the second
to some extent also, sentimental. The first could perhaps be overcome. I see no
objection to its being brought tactfully, if perhaps unofficially, to the notice of
the Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs at the proper time. The second,
however much sympathy it deserves, contains the germ of that very inequalitv
of thought which always has and always will poison our relations until all
suspicion of it is removed from the Iranian mind. It cannot be said to be in
accordance with the general attitude or policy of His Majesty’s Government
outlined earlier in this despatch. In the circumstances, I reluctantly feel that
this problem, which must in time be solved if durable friendly relations are to
be established, may have to be left to be dealt with later. If the present improve
ment in the atmosphere can be continued and other problems be disposed of, it
may be possible to approach it more hopefully on both sides. If the Iranian
Government ultimately recognise our position vis-a-vis the Arab rulers, the
argument on which we last based our refusal of their proposals will fall to the
ground. Time, moreover, may conduce to the development of a better standard
of behaviour on the part of the Iranian navy. One may almost hope that this
desirable development has begun—certainly there have been no serious incidents
recently and, probably owing to instructions sent by the Shah after his audience
of the Naval Commander-in-chief and myself on the 10th January, relations
between the Iranian and British naval forces in the Gulf have greatly improved.
It seems not unreasonable to hope that, if His Majesty were brought to under
stand our difficulty, he would issue orders enjoining proper treatment of vessels
stopped for visitation and search. In such circumstances, it may be possible in
time to extend the principle of co-operation, the germ of which we have seen in
the Iranian proposal regarding the lights and buoys. I understand that the
extent of the arms traffic in the Gulf is now small and, in present conditions, I
should have thought that the possibility of search by an Iranian warship would,
in itself, act as a very effective deterrent. In any case, I feel that it is essential
to the establishment of sound relations that this question should in time be
settled So long as our present attitude is maintained, it is impossible to argue
lhat we are anxious to treat Iran on equal terms as a civilised people, and until
we C an convince the Iranian Government of our determination to do this it is
hopeless to look for durable good lelations.