File 200/1928 Pt 10 'Persia: Anglo-Persian Relations. Treaty Negotiations' [‎70v] (141/868)

remains now to be seen how the Persian Government will receive the statement of
losses and damage, amounting in all to some £775, which I shall present before
leaving.
6. I last reported on the question of the numbering of boats at Hen jam in
my telegram No. 21 of the 15th January. I am inclined now to think that,
according to their lights, the Persian Government have shown themselves not
unaccommodating in this matter. They were persuaded without much difficulty
to suspend the demand while I obtained your instructions and discussed the
matter with the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, during his visit here from
the 9th-llth January. Since then, so far from pressing the demand again, they
have allowed the suspension to continue. It is now three weeks since I appealed
to the Prime Minister to prolong this state of affairs (as reported in my telegram
No. 21 of the 15th January), and I have allowed it to be understood that, in the
absence of an answer to my request, I should conclude that it was agreed to. I
last mentioned this subject to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on the
1st February, when I went slightly further and said I was beginning to assume
from the silence of the Prime Minister that he intended to allow the suspension
to run on indefinitely. Before leaving, I propose to ask him if I may rest assured
that during my absence (that is, till about the 8th March) the question will not
be raised. In any case, up to the present there has been no sign of a desire to
revive trouble over this matter.
7. The Bushire flag incident and the question of the British Indian
nationals at Charbar are in a less satisfactory position. I have reported
separately on these in my despatches Nos. 51 and 55 of the 2nd and 4th February
respectively. But, in conversation with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs
on the 1st February, I dealt with them also from the wider point of view of their
effect on our general relations. Speaking chiefly of the repeated failure of the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs to enforce obedience to their instructions by the
local authorities at Charbar, I said that I had made every possible effort to secure
a settlement of all these outstanding difficulties : in response to the Prime
Minister’s statements regarding the situation in Baluchistan, His Majesty’s
Government and the Government of India had shown the utmost readiness to
assist the Persian Government, and the joint meeting at Duzdap had been
arranged ; I had been assured by his Highness that a noticeable improvement in
our relations would be brought about if we could meet him on this point; the
Persian reply to our friendly action was this complete failure to co-operate in
disposing of the Charbar trouble; it was also incredible that it should take over
six weeks for them to deal with an incident such as that of the Bushire flag. As
long as these outstanding questions were left in their present unsatisfactory
condition, it was useless to discuss the major issues, and I could not do so.
M. Soheily fully admitted this. I appealed to him to dispose of the Charbar
and Bushire flag questions before I left on the 7th February. His Excellency
gave me assurances on this point. I trust he will succeed in carrying out his
promises.
8. On the whole, I am disposed to believe in the sincerity of the Ministry
for Foreign Affairs and in their desire to improve the position and dispose of
these questions, and I would say the same thing of the Prime Minister. The
main difficulty seems to be in the lack of influence which the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs have with other Departments, the entirely parochial outlook of other
Departments, the appalling dilatoriness, confusion and inefficiency of the
administrative system, the terror of the Shah, the obstructiveness of local officials
and the childish inability of Persians in general to admit that they are in the
wrong. The cumulative effect of these failings is often as bad as a deliberately
unfriendly policy, but I doubt whether this is what the Persian Government
desire. They have awkward problems on their western and eastern frontiers, and
they have shown a disposition to look to His Majesty’s Government for support
(however unreasonably) in their dispute with Iraq. * Even they could hardly be
capable of appealing to us for help and intentionally alienating us at the same
time. I therefore still hope to see all these smaller questions disposed of in
course of time.
9. It would appear reasonable to regard the realisation of this hope as a
test of the good intentions of the Persian Government. In the meanwhile I can
only point to declarations of goodwill on their part—the cordiality of the Shah’s
reception of the Commander-in-chief and myself, his apparently genuine wish