File 200/1928 Pt 10 'Persia: Anglo-Persian Relations. Treaty Negotiations' [‎75r] (150/868)

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THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OP HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOYERNMENT
PERSIA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[E 1473/76/34]
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March 4, 1935.
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Section 1.
No. 1.
A/r. Knatchbull-Hugessen to Sir John Simon.—{Received March 4.)
(No. 52.)
Tehran, February 2,
Afe 1 have had the honour to inform you in recent telegrams, several
intimations have been made to me in conversation by the Prime Minister, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs and M. Soheily, now acting in M. Kazemi’s place,
ot the intention of the Persian Government to resume negotiations on the maior
political questions outstanding between the two Governments, while the Shah
himseli has also spoken in a similar sense.
2. It seems improbable that any definite move will be made until M. Kazemi’s
return to Tehran, which I am informed will not take place till towards the end
of February Meanwhile I have made it clear that, the views of His Majesty’s
Government having already been defined, I have nothing further to say and shall
await advances from the Persian side.
3. A few days ago the subject came up in conversation with M Soheily I
repeated to his Excellency what I had said to the Prime Minister as to our
essential requirements regarding the Arab Rulers and Bahrein, and when
M. ^oheily enquired about Tamb and Abu Musa, I said that our attitude in
regard to Tamb had only recently been very clearly defined and that these islands
could by no pretext be regarded as Persian. M. Soheily retorted that not only
Iamb and Abu Musa but Bahrein and, indeed, large parts of Arabia were
Persian; to which I replied that on the same basis France and the United States
of America were British. In response to his plea that Tamb was so close to the
lersian mainland, I pointed out that the Channel Islands were very close to
F ranee.
4. The conversation had begun in a discussion of the Perso-Iraq frontier
question M. Soheily having reiterated the claim to the thalweg in the Shatt-el-
Arab. I have always endeavoured to direct the mind of the Persian Government
to the distinction between the juridical and the practical sides of this question
On this occasion I said that, if after only two months in Tehran I mio-ht be
allowed to speak as a friend of Persia, I would express the view that the Persian
Government had approached this question very unwisely by taking their stand
upon the juridical argument. The outcome of the appeal to Geneva was, of course
still uncertain, but it seemed to me most unlikely that the Persian Government
would win their case. They had advanced an extravagant claim and taken their
stand upon ground which they could not hold. They would in all probability
be compelled to withdraw. This was always painful and difficult. It would
oe more prudent on their part if they refrained from approaching questions by
advancing extravagant and untenable claims as they had done in the case of the
fenatt and, for instance, Bahrein. If we were to resume negotiations let us at
least J)e realistic and discuss only actual and practical problems.
5. I do not pretend that M. Soheily accepted my point of view. He informed
me, in reply to my remark that I should await advances from the Persian
Government, that the latter had their proposals ready. I have no idea what
these proposals are, but I think it certain that they will include a claim to Tamb
and Abu Musa.
6 In regard to Bahrein, both the Prime Minister's and M. Soheily’s general
attitude leads me to believe that there is no intention on the part of the Persian
Government to push their claim to the length of an appeal to Geneva, but only
to use it as a make-weight in future negotiations.
7. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Foreign Secretary to the
Government of India (No. 22). J
I have, &c.
H. M. KNATCHBULL-HUGESSEN.
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