File 200/1928 Pt 10 'Persia: Anglo-Persian Relations. Treaty Negotiations' [‎147r] (294/868)

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COLONEL FOWLE was of the opinion that both Basidu and Henjam
should be evacuated. As the Law Officers had given the opinion that Basidu
definitely did not belong to us, the Persians were in a position to demand that we
should evacuate it at their pleasure. If the question were referred to inter
national arbitration we should be forced to leave ignominiously, with a consequent
^oss of prestige. It was therefore better to withdraw voluntarily, as it was
obviously more graceful to walk out of the front door than to be kicked down the
back stairs.
The position at Henjam was on a different footing. This island had never
been regarded as British. If we were permitted to stay there, there was no doubt
that the Navy must be prepared to put up with insults and petty restrictions
derogatory to our dignity, such as had occurred in recent years. If we decide to
evacuate both these places, we can then take a strong line vis-a-vis the Persians,
whereas as long as we are in occupation we must swallow any insult the Persians
like to make. We ought, therefore, to have some alternative base ready. The
necessary land had been acquired at Bahrein. The other arrangements were, in
his view, purely naval questions.
THE CHAIRMAN stated that Colonel Towle’s views entirely coincided
with those which the Foreign Office had long held and had frequently expressed
at previous meetings. The present situation in the Gulf was most unsatisfactory
and precarious. At any moment an incident might occur, or our general relations
with Persia take a turn for the worse, with the result that we might be served
with a notice to quit Henjam immediately. The Admiralty had on previous
occasions laid great stress on the length of time which it would take to effect a
satisfactory transfer from Henjam to Bahrein, and the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. had
emphasised the importance of our maintaining our prestige in the Gulf. It
seemed, therefore, to the Foreign Office essential that, in view of the dangers of
the situation, we should be ready with an alternative without delay. It had been
suggested that Henjam and Basidu should be retained as long as possible as
bargaining counters in any future negotiations. There was something to be said
for this view, but it was important to realise that neither Henjam nor Basidu
were bargaining counters of the slightest real value. We had no rights at either,
and the Persians knew that they could eject us from both without giving us any
concession in return. To offer our evacuation as a “ concession ” to Persia in the
hope of thereby purchasing some counter-concession from Persia was, in the
Chairman’s view, simply offering Persia bad money. The value of such
“ bargaining counters ” was purely illusory, and our diplomatic position would
only be weakened if we attempted to use them. Meanwhile, our effort to hang on
at Henjam and Basidu put us at the mercy of the Persians, who could use the
threat of eviction—which we could not legally resist—as an effective means
of blackmailing us on any subject and at any moment.
Mr. LAITHWAITE said that Sir Samuel Hoare’s orders had not yet been
taken on the point, but that departmentally the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. concurred generally
with the Foreign Office proposal. There seemed strong objections, however, to
an expenditure by His Majesty’s Government of £400.000, which was the
estimate for making Bahrein fit for cruisers. A cruiser appeared in the Gulf
only about once a year at present, and, apart from that, the effect on the Peisians
of very elaborate preparations at Bahrein had to be considered. The Foreign
Office might be right in thinking that the psychological effect would be a good
one, but there were arguments on both sides. On the other hand, there seemed
much to be said for considering the minor scheme, the cost of which was
approximately estimated by the Admiralty at £40,000, exclusive of dredging.
It might also be possible to proceed with this scheme piecemeal. There seemed
to be a good deal to be said for putting down forthwith the necessary lights and
navigational beacons, to be followed subsequently by the erection of the necessai \
causeway, storehouses, canteens and other buildings.
He added that from a different standpoint there might be advantage in our
commencing to develop recreational facilities and a second na\al station at
Bahrein, ff it proved necessary in the future to evacuate Henjam, either under
Persian pressure, or voluntarily, the effect on prestige might be less if we could
represent our action as merely concentration of our arrangements at Bahrein,
which was more convenient from our point of view\