File 200/1928 Pt 10 'Persia: Anglo-Persian Relations. Treaty Negotiations' [‎148v] (297/868)

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the maintenance of the oil supplies of the British Navy, for which we were
ultimately dependent on Persian goodwill. It would strengthen our position in
Aiabia by putting an end to the state of constant friction arising out of the
present indeterminate position with regard to the Persian claims and the position
. Persian Navy in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ; it would make for peace and stabilitv
n ] Wlt b the future of which we were closely concerned, in view of the Treaty^
ot Alliance of 1930; generally speaking, it would help to stabilise international
relations in a manner not unfavourable to British interests throughout the Middle
i^ast On the other hand, if our relations with Persia were allowed to deteriorate
indefinitely, not only would the position of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company be
in danger since the Persians could not be relied upon in a matter of this kind
to see their own best financial interest—but Persia might easily fall increasingly
under Kussian domination, and, if the present regime were to collapse and chaos
were to supervene, the possibility could not be excluded of parts of northern and
eastern I ersia breaking up into satellite States of the Soviet Union. In the view
o e oreign Office, therefore, our aim should be to regularise our relations with
j 1 ersia and to support and try to keep on friendly terms with the present regime.
Ihe India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. he believed, did not entirely agree with this view. He
understood that they did not attach the same importance to the early regularisa-
tion ol our relations with Persia, and were prepared to carry on on the present
rather indeterminate basis indefinitely. He understood that they regarded the
possibility of the collapse of the present regime with equanimity. He asked
Mr. Laithwaite whether this correctly represented the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. view.
a * ^ ITH W AIT E said that the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. agreed as to the general
desirability of a treaty settlement on the lines hitherto contemplated, but that
they saw no need to make further sacrifices with a view to securing Persian
goodwill The concessions contemplated in the draft treaty appeared to
lepiesent the farthest point to which it was possible for His Majesty’s Govern
ment to go, and there seemed no possibility of discovering any' additional
inducement. 1 hey did not altogether share the fears of the Foreign Office as to
the developments which might occur if no settlement were reached, and they
considered it important that His Majesty’s Government should not show undue
eagerness to reach a settlement. On the whole, they thought that time was on
oui side, and that there would be no great danger in delay.
THE CHAIRMAN, continuing his analysis of the situation, said that he
understood that the Admiralty policy could be summed up in the one word
Henjam. r
The views of the Foreign Office on this question were well-known. But he
did wish to invite the attention of the Admiralty and of the Sub-Committee to
a comparison of the risks involved. The Admiralty desired to retain the use of
Henjam in order to maintain the efficiency of the British Navy in the Gulf
But if in order to maintain the efficiency of the Navy a policy were to be adopted
which was calculated to do serious injury to the major interests which the Navy
was intended to protect, we should be going round' in a circle. We should, in
tact, be defeating the major object, for the achievement of which the Navy was
only an instrument— i.e., the protection of the widest interests of the British
Fmpire—in order to develop the efficiency of the instrument itself Was not
such a policy illogical and inconsistent? 'Were the playing fields and canteens
of this small Persian island really worth the major political risks which we were
i unning foi their sake ? 1 he Admiralty admitted that Henjam was not absolutely
essential for the maintenance of the efficiency of the Navy, since Bahrein could,
if necessaiy, be used instead. And it was not even as though there were any real
hope of retaining the use of Henjam much longer. He reminded the meeting
that a year ago Sir R. Hoare had definitely ruled out any hope of obtaining a
lease. It had now become pretty clear that there was no hope of negotiating any
general treaty with Persia on the basis which had hitherto been contempfated.
and he was convinced that we should now never get even a “ Gentleman’s
Agreement ” about Henjam.
Mr. BAGGALLAY, who had recently returned from His Majesty’s Legation
at Tehran, considered that the Persians objected to the whole idea of the use of