File 200/1928 Pt 10 'Persia: Anglo-Persian Relations. Treaty Negotiations' [‎149r] (298/868)

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Henjam by His Majesty’s ships, and that they would certainly sooner or later
press for our evacuation. The difference between a formal lease and a
Gentleman s Agreement ” was unlikely to appeal to them.
I he CHAIRMAN suggested that it was for the Admiralty and the
1 reasury to decide the amount of the insurance premium that it would be
^|desirable to pay to guard against this risk. The Foreign Office could only point
out that the risk was there.
CAP I AIN KING said that he doubted whether the preparation of Bahrein
would assist the new Minister at Tehran in any negotiations with the Persian
authorities. He thought it probable that any development of Bahrein would be
the critical factor in deciding the Persian Government to ask for the evacuation
of Henjam. He reminded the meeting that the Persian claim to Bahrein had
recently been vigorously reasserted, and thought there would be a serious risk
that the Shah would regard any Naval activities there as an unfriendly and even
provocative act.
He was not in a position to give details of the estimate of £40,000 which had
been stated to be necessary in order to make Bahrein fit for use by sloops of the
Royal Navy. The setting up of navigational lights and beacons would be
essential, but it was possible that the causeway, whicn was estimated to cost some
£9,000, could be dispensed with for the present.
Mr. SEAL pointed out that, if the development of Bahrein was regarded
as an insurance premium, the Admiralty would be paying an insurance premium
of 100 per cent. In fact, he regarded any proposal to develop Bahrein before a
decision had been taken to evacuate Henjam as open to very serious financial
objection, since if we remained at Henjam, as might well be the case if history
repeated itself, the money would have been wasted.
CAPTAIN KING agreed that the Admiralty would not like to start on an
alternative scheme unless they were sure that there was no hope of retaining the
use of Henjam. He pointed out that the Foreign Office case turned on the alleged
fact that it would take fifteen months to improvise an alternative to Henjam.
Although it was true that the building of the projected base at Bahrein would
take at least fifteen months, nevertheless he felt confident that the Navy would
be able to improvise temporary accommodation very rapidly if they had to leave
Henjam.
Mr. LAITHWAITE suggested that it might be a help if the Admiralty
prepared an estimate of the proposed expenditure on Bahrein, giving the cost
of each item and the desired priority of work. It would then be possible to find
out what was the minimum insurance necessary for the Navy to carry on at
Bahrein should we be ordered to quit Henjam.
THE CHAIRMAN thought that, although it was not possible for the
Sub-Committee to put forward any new recommendations to Ministers, the
discussion had been justified, as it had enabled the Sub-Committee to become
acquainted at first hand with the views of Colonel Fowle and of Mr. Knatchbull-
Hugessen, had enabled both these officers to hear the views of the interested
departments of His Majesty’s Government, and had rendered possible a restate
ment and reassessment of the position. He summarised the new factors which
had arisen since the meeting of the Ministerial Sub-Committee on the 11th June
last as follows :—
I. The report of the Law Officers on the Persian claim to Bahrein.
This was categorically against the Persian claim and greatly strengthened
the position of His Majesty’s Government in taking any measures they thought
necessary at Bahrein and taking a firm line vis-a-vis the Persian claim.
II. —Political developments.
(1) The new exchange of Ministers with Persia, i.e.. the arrival of a new
Persian Minister in London with apparently a special mandate to try to improve
relations and Mr. Knatchbull-Hugessen’s impending departure for Tehran. The
Persians had intimated that they expected favourable developments as a result
of this new exchange of Ministers and if no favourable results occurred the
situation might be expected rapidly to deteriorate.