File 200/1928 Pt 10 'Persia: Anglo-Persian Relations. Treaty Negotiations' [‎170r] (340/868)

This Document i8 the property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.
SECRET.
M.E.(M) 46.
Copy Xo.
COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.
Standing Ministerial Sub-Committee for Questions concerning the Middle East.
PERSIAN POLICY.
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India.
MinLfptuG 'T'r^ i nt . erest the valuable Memorandum circulated to the
consk er; F A Con ™ ltte , e h J , Sir Robert Vaasittart, and I have carefully
of tho rbW,- ^^ 10 ^ a ? ai 1 n ^ the . ll sht of the proposals in that Memorandum and
4 h Mav wkh vbkA 1 t0 ,f pl3Ce H , 1 , , the O fficial 1Iidd,e East Sub-Committee on
itn Jlay, AMtli whicn my colleagues aviII be familiar.
ua s f'in Sll h 1 vnnr r L VilU A tart ’ S r Iem0r ? udura refers t0 tbe fact that 11)ave been in the
OTio-imll! An ! i l ] fin 1 r r S ,1Cy and enggeats in conclusion that “the firmer policy
the Cabinet A fhF Y the K SeCretai ' y State for India and approved in principle by
Lonu • a i• • i ^ pRSt, anu tiiat 1 still am, in favour of usinsr a firm
reprt ntatfveYin Tl Viffi "T, ^ ^ ^ su ^ ested by tb e ^igt Offic"
a firm policy ° Sub ' CoInmlttee ' vas not, I fear, my understanding of
touch onT'nnmW "of 11 • the plaCe that ^ Memorandum does not
toucn on a number of important points of detail. These have no doubt been
nneA ered ’ h’ 1 n ° r ® fe !' ence 13 ma(1e to them. The points which I have in mind are
questions such as whether any action is to be taken in regard to the further with
drawal of the railhead of the Duzdap Railway from Nok-Kundi to Dalbandin • at
wliatp.ease stage and for what ostensible reason the proposed evacuation of Baskin
lien jam is to take place ; the precise date or stage at which the naval base (which
o Y rrT ybe a A r r fi t d baSe > is t0 be established at Bahrein- the probable
should h . C1 a , bas e and whether it is really essential that the base or naval station
equipped foYTonsY C1 '" 1SerS ’ or "' betber 14 would not suffice that it should be
FoV? 1 - 1 1 P ( sers very )arel .y entering the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. )- whether
tW° n 138 be , en . glVe f l ? ! be Possibility, in the event of our playing our cards
Buslii're fat a nrobahle ctmA " A 3 dema ? d f ° r tbe removal of tbe Residency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, established in the provinces and regions considered part of, or under the influence of, British India. from
most imnni fAf tA cost .’ 30 lar a3 . ca n be estimated, of £100,000); and, finally and
nost impoitant, the possible reactions on the position of the Anglo-Persian Oil
maS 7 "finUdonot propose to ^b^eJ^auITetirnow f or7 feTt hAY
by the office ^-A Sii
4. I will explain my objections in more detail. On the one hand adoption of tl,*
scheme proposed would involve the voluntary evacuation of our two navafstatious in
Pers.a without any guid pro. quo, and it would be one more step iu the process of
gwng up the desiderata with which we started negotiations. We should get no
!enmd ti r T Y J t e r sians , ! or evacuating Basidu and Henjam, and it would be^epre-
sented that we had been driven out of these places, with the result that our prestige
in the Gulf would suffer. On the other hand, it might tend to stimulate Persiafo
to t rfu-engtrofAhV Y f 1 ' 6111 - 1 b3Ve - COt in the p3St been enti ^ convinced as
tome stiength of the case for our remaining m Rasidu and Hen jam and I should
have welcomed a settlement in regard to them of the nature contenipiated Athe
eisian ft eaty under which vve would surrender Basidu and keep Henjam for a term
of }eais. But that is a very different thing from a voluntary evacuation. As regards
a rem, I ask my colleagues to consider why we should be invited to throw down
an unanswerable challenge to the Persian claim to Bahrein ” ? \y e are j n possession
at Bahrein ; we or our clients, have been there for 150 years, and there is no reason
mt I can see why we should make the task of the Persians easier. It is for them to
challenge our position, and, if they are able to do so, to produce the arguments in
286 A 65 6.34