File 200/1928 Pt 10 'Persia: Anglo-Persian Relations. Treaty Negotiations' [‎387v] (775/868)

border (see my despatches Nos. 112 and 118 of the 3rd and 10th March
respectively).
11. In these and other cases, including the flagrant discourtesy shown to
Mr. Christopher Sykes, there is, theoretically, a bare possibility that the Persian
authorities have not acted under direct orders from the Shah, but are merely
carrying out what they believe (erroneously) to be the general sense of his wishe^j^
However, the press campaign against the Qajars and Feroughi's language ana
demeanour, as reported in my despatch No. 49 of the 1st February, when I talked
to him about it, made it abundantly clear that the Shah is in a mood of black
suspicion, and that, so far as Feroughi is concerned, the only activity which he
intends to display is to wait and hope that the clouds will roll away. That
Kazemi is of the same mind is shown by his obscurely worded letter on the subject
of mistrust, enclosed in my despatch No. 148 of the 24th March. I think, in fact,
that they are both sure that the Shah’s present mood is such that it would be a
risky business to recommend for his approval any treaty with us which had failed
to secure Persia’s maximum demands, and therefore they take refuge in silence.
12. It is a matter of absolute obscurity to me to understand why the Shah
has once again swung away, unless it be that he feels that he is better off without
a settlement. We met him handsomely over the Basidu incident, and since that
matter and the press incident were settled, there has been, so far as we know,
nothing more substantial than our entirely imaginary interest in the Qajars and
equally imaginary intrigues in Baluchistan. There is, of course, the possibility
that one of the Bakhtiari Khans has, in the course of examination in prison, made
statements which have appeared to the Shah definitely to compromise us, but this
is a mere guess.
13. There is also the possibility that the Shah has, for the first time, made
himself acquainted with the details of the draft treaty, which is largely the work
of Teymourtache, and has decided that it is not sufficiently favourable, the more
so that he is convinced in his heart that a stable and independent Persia is our
prime interest, and that we shall therefore never do anything which might weaken
his hold on the country. Believing that, he is unlikely to be willing to renounce
territorial claims, however nebulous, unless there is a prospect, of which there has
been no evidence hitherto, of our exerting strong pressure. The case may, in
fact, be similar to that of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. He tore up
Teymourtache’s partial settlement, largely because he had decided to break him,
and he resolved to impose on the company a dictated agreement, but he over
reached himself and, to save his face, he was compelled to play the statesman.
14. In the case of the treaty he may again have determined to tear up
Teymourtache’s work and, in conjunction with Kazemi, he may be engaged in
elaborating some quite inacceptable draft. Incidentally, it must not be forgotten,
in view of the Shah’s voracious appetite, that the existence of valuable oil deposits
in Bahrein has been proved since Teymourtache agreed in principle to abandon
Persia’s claim to sovereign rights.
15. Whether or not any one of the hypotheses I have suggested is correct,
there is no doubt in my mind that his Ministers are reflecting his mood faithfully
enough.
16. With regard to the possibility of a “ direct appeal to the Shah,” my
belief, therefore, is that I could only obtain an audience if it were made clear
that a refusal or evasion would lead to my withdrawal and to a definite change
in our policy. Obviously, that is no sort of prelude to the conclusion of a treaty
of friendship; it might work, but it is too alien to our technique and mentality,
and it is too akin to the apache’s attitude towards a girl who seems likely to
resist him.
17. The foregoing paragraphs contain, I think, a reply, both direct and
implicit, to the points raised m the first paragraph of your telegram, the answer
being that something—I do not know what—has occurred to make Feroughi and
Kazemi sure that the Shah no longer wants treaty negotiations initiated, and that
a simple a^yeal to the Shah would remain unanswered.
18. I am inclined to agree with the suggestion in paragraph 2 of your
telegram that formal assurances of good conduct would be refused if the request
were merely made for the observance of the status quo as in the past, but the
appearance of finality—“ We consider the negotiations to be definitely abandoned
and . . . .’’—would, as likely as not, frighten the Persian Government into
compliance and the resumption of negotiations, because they would interpret that