'File XXV/7 Arabian Politics (including Iraq). Bin Saud, Akhwan, the Hejaz, 1920-1928' [‎39r] (88/494)

s
MejGZ Post-TFar Finance.
the tbouglZrcidzlToufd ^tilfcolderZ tfme'ipe for Ae'remoTalcif^th’'
^aXed b^e r^Sr ^ ° f ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
mercenaries^ under t^e^styfoo^Officer^of'th'^Arab'Arinj^^m'ebem scandalous-
ly ovei paid and have exercised in the fullest measure their ample talents in
fleecing their chiefs, the Emirs Abdullah and Ali, by inflating pay lists, selling
(jOyernment stores and indulging in every other form of direct and indirect
robbery. Nine months ago Emir Abdullah’s regular army of about 250 men
was costing, in pay alone, £4,000 per month.
In addition to this peculation, gold sovereigns have been melted up by
thousands and converted into fancy swords, daggers, etc., for distribution broad
cast as presents to paltry Sheikhs and slaves, and as sops to potential enemies.
Much money has been spent by the King and his sons on propaganda in
the Iraq, Yemen and Syria. Erom the earliest days of. the revolt the Bedouin
have been unreasonably overpaid, a simple Bedouin receiving £3 per month for
his personal services and £3 extra for his camel.
There is a story going round, too, of a gold tea service which is said to have
Been made at Mecca at a cost of £10,000 for use in the Royal House,,
To those British officers who witnessed something of the misuse of British
subsidies and who are still unconvinced that the results are commensurate with
the outlay, the recent progressive reduction of the King’s monthly subsidy of
£100,000, by monthly decrements of £25,000 in October, November and
December, brought so great a feeling of relief that they may have overlooked
the fact that the future of the Hejaz is a question closely affecting British
interests and one calling urgently for consideration.
In establishing the i ew Hejaz State His Majesty’s Government incurred a
moral responsibility for its future and even had they not given King Husein a
written promise to assist him in every way and to provide advisers (which he
agreed to accept) it would still be in their own interests to take steps to secure
and maintain a sound government in his Kingdom.
The importance of the pilgrimage to the Empire has been dealt with too
often already to need further emphasis here. Further, the Hejaz has not been
properly explored and there may yet be more gold in Midian than the intrusive
deposits now lying beneath the tents of the Bedouin. Oil is rumoured to exist
on the Red Sea coast and other places, whilst there are many native stories of
the existence of metals of all kinds in the neighbourhood of laif.
Eighty per cent, of the Hejaz imports are received from India whilst a
recent report from Mecca contains the surprising statement that halt the popu
lation of Mecca is Indian. These are important facts. .
■From every pent of view therefore-it appears desirable that King Husein
.houid recefve future financial aid from us, but we know well that he cannot be
trusted to use fubds properly or to lead his country towards prosperity without
trustea to use tunas prop ^ h Q keeps and ladles out the subsidy.
guidance. It .s should be conditional on his accepting
lam of opinion that our future neip snoum e .... us or other .
our advice, elt 1 ’ ie ^iu'the empkiynieut and development of his resources
wise (as may be decided), in tne p y^ ^ Husein further mmey
“ante without Ms a ti 1 ng OP on the very necessary condition would, in my opinion,
be throwing more mocey away.