Notes Prepared for Reference during Curzon’s Tour of the Persian Gulf, and Other Papers on Persia and the Persian Gulf [‎87r] (173/678)

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The recommendations of the conference and the considerations on which
they were based, may he summarised very briefly as follows:—
The desirability of not allowing Eussia to occupy the south of Persia is
recognized by all, at the same time ;
(1) The Admiralty consider that “ a Eussian occupation of Persia, re
garded fiom the point of view of the Admiralty only, would be a
sure cause of increased naval expenditure but not per se a suffi
cient CASUS BELLI.”
(2) The War Oefice point out that we have no available troops with
which to hold the country, and that it is better not to occupy it
at all than to risk the loss of prestige that would follow on a
forced withdrawal later. They hold'that, if Persia is broken up,
we must at least secure Seistan and keep Russia out of the Persian
Gulf, but that it would be dangerous under present circumstances
to risk a war with Prance and Eussia.
(3) The Conference, after considering these points, and others of a
purely political nature, recommended that in case of
(a) war with Eussia, (l) the occupation by Eussia of the
North of Persia,
our action should be confined to :
(1) The occupation of Seistan or preparations to occupy it if necessary.
( r ) seizure.and occupation of Eunder Abbas and adjacent islands.
(3) The protection of British influence at Bushire and other ports in the
Gulf.
It is impossible not to recognize the force of the facts and arguments brought
forward by the War Office, however unpleasant such recognition may be. °To
quote from Lieutenant-Colonel Altham’s memorandum, “ there is in fact no
sound solution of the Persian question if we adhere to our present lines of
military organization and to our present policy of isolation from all European
lo keep Eussia out of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. it is not sufficient to occupy Seistan
and Bunder Abbas only, for to allow Eussia to absorb the hinterland of Bunder
Abbas would, as pointed out in the last paragraph of the Admiralty memoran
dum, be eventually to render that port itself untenable and our object in occu
pying it would obviously not be fulfilled if we allowed Eussia to seize Charbar
or some other port to the east of Bunder Abbas. To attain our object we must
be piepared if necessary to defend the wTiole triangle of country included
between the line Seistan-Bunder Abbas, our present frontier in Baluchistan
and the sea. There are two ways in which this might be done. We mi "lit
select for defence some line between the Kashan-Yezd-Karman-Bam road and
the sea, which w r ith the occupation of Seistan and taking into account the limita
tions on the movement of troops which the geographical features of the country
impose, would be sufficient to attain our object. Such a line, wherever we
take it, could not w r ell be less than 200 miles long and it would be an extremely
difficult position to. hold against Eussia fairly established in the south-west of
Persia, and advancing along the numerous roads wdiich lead south-eastwards
from the line Kashan-Isfahan-Shiraz-Bushire. Moreover it includes no races
who, if enlisted in our service, could be of any assistance to us in expellin 0 ’ an
invader. 1 °
The other alternative is to occupy a line with its right covering Isfahan
and its left on the Turkish frontier. This would vary in length according to
its. position, from about 250 miles along the line Isfahan-Dizful, to nearly 400
miles in the direction Isfahan-Khanikin. The country through which it runs
is difficult and mountainous, and admirably suited for defence : the roads which
traverse it from north to south are mere hill tracks and it is peopled by well
armed and warlike tribes who, if organized and led by British officers, would
according to all accounts form a very valuable addition to our fightin" strength
Between Isfahan and Seistan there is only one road by which large °bodies of
troops could be moved from the north of Persia towards the sea, namely that
which runs from Kashan, Yezd and Kerman, and Isfahan occupies such a position
on the flank of this road, that it would be impossible for a force from the north
to use it without first detaching a sufficient number of troops to effectuallv
mask Isfahan. J
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