Notes Prepared for Reference during Curzon’s Tour of the Persian Gulf, and Other Papers on Persia and the Persian Gulf [‎87v] (174/678)

To hold this line and Seistan is to deny to an adversary in the north the
whole of southern Persia. To allow Russia to occupy the south-west of Persia ia
to place ourselves at such a disadvantage that it would appear to be better for us
to give up all idea of holding Bunder Abbas or any other point on the mainland
of Persia, and to content ourselves with Seistan and our present frontier to the
south of it : while by occupying and fortifying Has Musandim and possibly some
of the islands in the Gulf, we might do our best to neutralise the value of the
latter to Russia. It is also to definitely isolate India from all hope of future land
communication with Europe or any of our foreign possessions except through
Russian territory.
If then we are to keep Russia out of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , it is of the greatest
importance that we should prevent her from obtaining a foothold in south,
western Persia : and in the absence either of troops which could, in case of war,
be spared to hold it, or of an ally who would be prepared to defend this part of
the country against Russian aggression, the only other course open to us is to
endeavour, if possible, to organize such assistance among the people of the
country, as would render the task of occupying Isfahan and the territory to the
south of it as difficult for our enemies as possible.
The only tribes in southern Persia which appear capable of offering any
resistance to a civilised power are the Lurs, Bakhtiaris, Kashkais and Arab tribes
of Arahistan. All of these, and especially the first three, are described as hardy,
courageous and warlike races, possessing a large number of modern weapons,
and trained in their use. Of these, the Bakhtiaris, who occupy the country
immediately to the west of Isfahan, are perhaps the most important. The
numbers which they could put into the field have been variously estimated, but
according to Mr. Preece, who probably knows more about them than any other
European in Persia, their chief could gather a following of 20,000 men in a
month. Our own experience among the Afridis and other tribes of the north
west frontier of India has shown us how formidable an opponent any deter
mined body of men, armed with good weapons and skilled in their use* can be ;
especially in a mountainous country with which they are thoroughly familiar.
It is not contended that these tribesmen could stand up to Russian troops
in the open, nor would it be wise for them to do so, even if they could be
induced to attempt it. Their role would be rather to carry on a guerilla warfare,
to utilise their position to harass the Hanks of any force advancing towards
Isfahan from the north, and in case of occupation of the latter town by the
enemy, by repeated and persistent attacks on his line of communications to
render his tenure as unsafe as possible. At the same time they would be
prepared to resist to the utmost any attempt to enter their country either for the
purpose of reducing them to subjection or of reaching the Karan from this
direction.
Similarly in case of occupation by Russia of Kermanshah and Hamadan,
the Lur tribes which inhabit the bills between the Bakhtiaris and the Turkish
frontier could by repeated raids into the country round these towns, compel
the Russians to keep there a much larger body of troops than they would
otherwise require, and could offer a formidable resistance to any attempt to
reach the lower Karun from the north. The Kashkais and Arab tribes further
to the south might also be utilised to oppose any advance towards the country
they inhabit.
All these would of course require assistance from us, in the way of
officers to organise and lead them, money, arms, and ammunition ; and above
all it will be necessary to gain their confidence beforehand so as to induce them
to act with us.
_ It will doubtless be argued that it is absurd to expect a horde of undis
ciplined tribesmen to offer any serious resistance to a great power, and there
is no doubt that Russia could in time bring against them sufficient force to
crush their opposition and reduce them to complete subjection. Whether in
case of war with England she would be prepared to do so is at least doubtful.
W hether acting alone or in conjunction with Erance, all land operations in
Asia would be conducted by Russia only. Under present circumstances her
main efforts would in all probability be directed against India, which is the
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