File 1749/1921 ‘Persian Gulf:- Residency news summaries 1921-25’ [‎130v] (275/494)

that be, and he certainly had to mask his real feelings and cultivate workable relations
with Reza Khan in order to resume office in June last. The opinion which I have
formed of Kawam-es-Sultaneh is that his duplicity and his resourcefulness are unusual,
even for a Persian, that in all his doublings, turnings and intrigues there is a
remarkable streak of tenacity, and that it is this last quality which has raised him to
his high position. After the exposure of his bad faith towards myself as regards the
Arabistan affair, an exposure which was accompanied by his humiliation in the presence
of Reza Khan, and was therefore doubly bitter, he must, I think, have sat down to
think whether there were any means of escaping, without loss of prestige, from the
awkward position in which the unmasking of his own duplicity had placed him. My
conjecture is that he decided then not to warn the Bakhtiari, and to let matters take
their course. He cannot have been unaware that the Bakhtiari tribesmen would keenly
resent this intrusion into their own country of what they practically regard as a foreign
force, and that there was a chance of their indignation being manifested in an
injudicious manner. In the circumstances there were two alternatives possible : either
the detachment would go through safely, in which case all would be well, or it would
be attacked, and the blame could be thrown on to other shoulders. If my surmise is
correct, his calculation was as follows : “ If the force is attacked, the Bakhtiaris will be
responsible and the blame can be fixed on them ; this will create trouble and perhaps
open conflict between Reza Khan and the Bakhtiari, which I (Kawam) can view with
complacency, for Reza Khan will have his hands full; furthermore, the Bakhtiari are
friends of the British, and the slightest hint that their wicked action was taken at
British instigation will at once be taken up and create such a stir that my role in the
matter will pass unnoticed ; again, if Reza Khan can be brought to believe that
the British were behind it, I shall be able to set him and the British Minister by the
ears, with obvious advantage to myself. So I stand to win, whatever happens.” If
my conjecture be at all true, his Highness’s cynical calculations, as your Lordship will
have already learnt from my telegraphic reports, were not very wide of the mark. One
Persian acquaintance of mine told me that Kawam-es-Sultaneh had himself prompted
some of the anti-British press articles in connection with the attack on the Arabistan
force, the violent and disgraceful character of which led to the very strong representa
tions on my part to the Persian Government, with which your Lordship is already
acquainted. Although, however, I consider his Highness to be fully capable of such
action, I prefer not to believe this allegation without more positive evidence of its
truth. I do not for a moment imagine that your Lordship entertains any illusions
concerning the character of the man to whom the destinies of Persia are entrusted at
the present day, but I have gone into this matter with some detail as it is an illustratio,n
of the base depths to which political morality has sunk in this country.
Meanwhile it became necessary to ascertain, if possible, what were the intentions
ot the Persian Government, and especially of Reza Khan. It was evident that they
suspected the Bakhtiari and also the Sheikh of Mohammerah ; it was more than
possible that in a fit of childish rage and to salve their wounded pride they might
undertake a regular campaign against the Bakhtiari and the sheikh and risk plunging
the country into civil war ; it was certain that any such tendency would be encouraged
by the Bolsheviks by every means at their disposal. If anyone could supply an answer
to the question it was Reza Khan, and I therefore took an opportunity, when things
had calmed down somewhat and the Persian Government had had time to digest the
situation, to have a long private conversation with him. I went patiently again over
the old ground, laying especial stress on the operations of the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company and their susceptibility to any disturbances, even in the approximate vicinity
ot the oil-fields. I was unable to extract any definite statement of the Minister’s
intentions ; he did, however, give me two positive assurances; (1) that he recognised the
position of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and that he would never take any action
liable to endanger its operations ; (2) that he did not contemplate any violent measures
in the immediate future. He did allude, however, rather darkly to a plan which he
was maturing in his head and intended to execute when all the preparations were
completed to ensure its success, but I failed to elicit its nature. It would be useless to
question Kawam-es-Sultaneh on the subject, as lie would not tell me the truth.
Besides this action, I directed His Majesty’s consul-general at Ispahan to keep a
vigilant watch over any preparations for the formation of an expeditionary or punitive
force in his district, and to report to me regularly any information on that subject. 1
furthermore acquainted the Bakhtiari khans and the Sheikh of Mohammerah with the
assurances given to me by Sardar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. Sepah, and urged them very strongly to do their
utmost to dispel any suspicions which might be entertained in their regard, to refrain