'File 8/62 IV PRINCIPAL SHAIKHS & TRIBES OF OMAN.' [‎88r] (175/282)

i ^ SeaeeT- , ‘
* • ADDITIONS TO NOTES ON THE TRIBES.OF THE
* v ' SULTANATE of muscat and
The general situation now (30th April 1951) appears to
be that the Imam has not confirmed the nomination of any definite
successor which he is believed to have made dering his illness
in 1948o Shaikh Sulaiman bin IIamyar ; the Ghafiri leader, is,
however ? said to be still sponsoring"the candidature of Abdulla,
the second son of the previous Imam, and one of the present
Walls. This is opposed by Shaikh Saleh bin Isa, the Hinawi
leader, vrho wants the next Imam to be a Hinawi. He appears to
have no actual nominee at present, though Shaikh Abdulla bin
Ali Khalili, a nephew of the existing Imam, is mentioned.
In the meantime the Sultan is wooing both leaders with
presents and hospitality to obtain their allegiance and to
neutralize the position of the Imam generally. He is, however,
careful not to make this apparent, and maintains friendly
correspondence and relations generally with the Imam. He hopes
that upon the death of the Imam, the tribes, influenced by
these leaders and persuaded that reform, development and
financial benefit dwtonly to be found through the Sultan, will'
discard the idea of an Inanate altogether, and unite with the
rest of the Sultanate into one kingdom with himself as head.
But in all this the Sultan cannot afford to overlook the
susceptibilities of the old fashioned tribesmen, particularly
the puritanical and reactionary Ibadhis, and this fact may
help towards an understanding of the extreme caution invariably
displayed by the Sultan in sponsoring any move for modernisation
or development. What may seem depressingly slow to a western
mind may be considered dangerously fast in this backwater of
Arabia c It also explains, though not necessarily excuses,
certain tiresome petty restrictions in the capital.
Shaikh Sulaiman bin Hamyar 3 who is ambitious and
more progressive than most of the Shaikhs, has also ideas of
securing recognition of himself as an independent Shaikh ? and
has made certain overtures, without success, to the,British
authorities, and, it is thought, may now be looking into the
possibilities of achieving his purpose through American and
Saudi contacts. Besides him and Salih bin Isa, the only other
Shaikhs enjoying complete power and backing of their tribes
to the extent of imposing capital punishment are Saif bin Amir of
, the Beni ‘Ali in Dhahirah and Nasir bin Mohammad of Beni bu ! Ali
sjaX^o^ - In Ua ; alarm and it is through these men that the Sultan hopes to
be able to extend his influence over the tribes of the interior.
Saif bin Amir is already a close friend and nay prove helpful
in the Buraini area.
The Imam recently demonstrated that his rule still
possesses considerable virility when he raised and successfully
delegated a force of three or four hundred to recover some
kidnapped women and to deal with certain leaders of Dhahirah
suspected of complicity. This was done in co-operation with
the Muscat Government, and there have been other signs of a
certain unity of mind and of purpose existing between the Sultan,
Imam and the more powerful leaders ? mentioned above, in dealing
with external influences, whilst a number of smaller Shaikhs in
the Jau and Mahadhah tracts (Beni Ka'ab, el Na’im and al bu Shamis'
have been writing affirming their loyalty and recognition of the
Sultan. Though Sulaiman bin Hamyar and one or two of the Buraimi
Shaikhs show signs of willingness to negotiate for oil development,
the bulk of the Shaikhs of the interior, headed by the Imam, appear
solidly opposed to it or to any exploitation by Europeans or
Americans, and the Sultan Is convinced that it is still unsafe
and premature for attempts to be made, and that no single Shaikh
could enter into direct negotiations without bringing all the
others against him, thus rendering him impotent.