'Minutes memos despatches etc' [‎6r] (11/156)

D.vi.
t, WAB CABXIfTDT.
SECRET.
EASTERN COMEiITTEB. E.C.1788.
Prom:- C* in 0., India.
To:- War Office.
Despatched 12.10 a*m. 1.10.18.
Received 10.25 p.m. 2.10.18. '
78587 Q. 13. September 3Cih.
Operations.
Paragraph 1. Telegrsia Z*2507 September 26th from Porco V
indicates 50 miles 50 lb frails now in hand in Mesopotamia instead
of being devoted to Persian eztaneion are about to bo used for
Euphrates line. Marshall moreover is apparently ear-marking
rolling stock for Euphrates line in preference to Persian. . In
consequence of this double programme urgent demand for further
supplies of rails and rolling stock are mads by him.
2. As you are aware I have always had serious doubts as to
military necessity of completing the Euphrates line. The present
Tigris L. of 0. is not only ample for Marshall's existing force
including that in Persia but possesses a margin of considerable
surplus capacity. The Euphrates line project originated from
Freeland’s report which v/as based on the hypothesis of the mainten
ance of 11 divisions. Allenby 1 s victory in.Palestine has now so
materially altered the military situation as to permit of a
reduction to an 8 division standard which in my opinion will be ample
to cover every reasonable forecast of Mesopotamia’s future
liabilities, including that of the Caspian.
3. The only grounds left for constructing a new L. of C. therefore
are the development ox local r sources on the Euphrates and a
possible reduction in tho total personnel employed in transporta
tion services. Former should be met by light feeder lines from
Eillah and development of river transport on Euphrates which will
be practicable on completion of canal now being dredged through
Hamer Lake. As to hope for reduction in personnel I have grave
doubts of its being resllsed for a considerable period.
4. As regards roiling stock, the provision of arranged stock
referred to in Marshall’s telegram Z.9728 June 22nd would on
present Tigris railway system cover the increa.se of number of
trains per day from 8 to 14 and allow for 4 trains on Baghdad-
Khanikin section. Former is no?; unnecessary, having in view
considerations stated in paragraph 2 above. Thus the portion of
stock under order originally intended for the Tigris provided
Euphrates project was dropped could be made available for allotment
to the extension beyond Mhanikin.
5. It is true the Euphrates lino would ensure some administrative
advantages in point of quickness of transit but against this must
be set the following :-
(a) urgent need for economising ix railway material, especially
in view of India’s present needs sot forth in previous telegrams to
you and India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. . (b) Difficulties of freight. fc) lost in
money material and labour of equipping a new L. of 0. with accommo
dation for troops hospitals supply depots etc.
6. Marshall’s proposal to divide between the Euphrates lino and
the Persian extension the rails end rolling stock now available or
under orders overlooks or misapprehends the decision stated in
paragraph 4 of your telegram 65249 D.M.O* August 28th that the
Persian extension is to be given priority.
7. I would now go further however and advise that in the
present strategical economic situation all resources and.
energy should bo centred on tho Persian line and the Euphrates
project definitely abandoned. *