'Minutes memos despatches etc' [‎9r] (17/156)

To;- 7 ar Office,
Froiaj- C* , India.
Despatched 12.10 a.m. l.lO*lB.
Received 1 q* 25 p # m. 2.1o.lB.
785 B 7 3 September 30 th.
Operations.
paragraph 1. Telegram X.250? September 26th from Force D«
indicates 50 milec 5 c lb rails no r ' in hand in Ilesopotarnia instead
of being devoted to Persian extension are about to be used for
Euphrates line, Marshall mor:ever to apparently ear-marking
rolling stock for Euphrates line in preference to Persian, In
consequence of this double programme urgent demand for further
supplies of rails and rolling stock are made by him.
2, As you ?-re avrare I have al^rayc had serious doubts as
to military necessity of completing the Euphrates line. The
present Tigris L* cf C. io not only ample for Harshallis existing
force including that in Persia but possesses a margin of consider
able surplus capacity. The Euphrates line project originated
from Freeland* s report rrhich nao based on the hypothesis of the
maintenance of 11 divisions. Allenby* 3 victory in Palestine
hns nov: so materially altered the military situation as to permit
of a reduction to an 8 division standard vhich in my opinion
v:ill be ample to cover every reasonable forecast of Mesopotamia's
future liabilities, including that of the Caspian.
3. The only grounds left for constructing a nevr L*of c.
therefore, are the development of local resources on the
Euphrates and a possible reduction in the total personnel employ
ed in transportation services. Former should be met by light
feeder lines from Hi11ah and development of river transport
on Euphrates v/hich will be practicable on completion of canal
now being dredged through Hamer Lake. As to hoped for reduct
ion in personnel I have grave doubts of its being realized for
a considerable period.
4*. As regards rolling stock, the provision of arranged
stock referred to in Marshall's telegram X.9728 June 22nd would
on present Tigris railway system • cover th^ increase of number
of trains per day from 8 to 14 and allow for 4 trains on
Baghdad-Khanikin section. Former is nor; unneceosary^having in
view considerations stated in paragraph 2 above. Thus the
portion of stock under order originally intended for the Tigris
provided Euphrates project was dropped coula be made availablo
for allotment to tht axtonoion beyond Khanikin.
5. It is true the Euphrates lino would ensure some
adjoin!otrative advantages in point of ouiuicnoss of transit but
against this must be set the folxowing:-
(a) urgent need for economising in rail , *ay material, especially
in vie”' of India's present needs set forth in previous telegrams
to you and India office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. * (b) Difficulties of freight.
(c) Cost in -aoney material and labour of equipping a new L*of C*
with accommodation for troops hospitals supply depots etc.
6 . iiarshall'e proposal to divide between the Euphrates
line and the Persian extension the rails and rolling stuck now
available or under orders overlooks or misapprehends the deoision
stated in paragraph 4 of your telegram 6J249 D.1I.0* August 28th
that the Persian extension is to be given priority.
7 . I would nov: go further however and advise that in tho
present strategical and economic situation all resources and
energy should be centred on the Persian line and the Euphrates
project definitely abandoned.