'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎12v] (29/384)

Early in 1905 the question of British policy in Persia was referred for
Views of Imperial Defence Committee, the consideration of the Committee of
March 1905 . Imperial Defence, and the conclusions
formulated at a meeting held on the 22nd March 1905 were as follows :—
(1) It is essential to maintain, and, if possible, to increase our influence at
Tehran, in order that we may be able to control railway construction in Persia,
which is by far the most important factor of the strategic situation.
(2) It should he our object, on commercial as well as on strategic grounds,
to maintain the status quo in Persia.
(3) It is essential to maintain our existing claims on the coast of the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. without aggression or otesntation.
(4) Financial assistance may he inevitable in certain cases, but is not
desirable in principle. Each case should be considered on its merits.
These conclusions, though communicated privately to Lord Curzon, were
not imparted to the Government of India in any official manner. In June
of the same year, Sir Arthur Hardinge forwarded to the Government of India
a copy of a despatch in which he discussed the question of British policy in
Persia with special reference to the proposed partition into spheres of influence.
The Minister pointed out that the inevitable result of such a course would be
the eventual establishment of what to all intents and purposes would amount
to Protectorates in Northern and Southern Persia; that even if the partition
permitted the exercise of B-ussian influence as far south as the head of the Gulf
in Western Persia, it was still doubtful whether Russia would consent to be
excluded from the sea on the eastern side ; while any proposal which contem
plated the complete exclusion of Russia from the sea was, in his opinion, clearly
impracticable. The course which Sir Arthur Hardinge preferred was one of
joint action with Russia with the common object of postponing the crisis
towards which the affairs of Persia seemed to tend.
On receipt of this communication, Lord Curzon again determined to
address His Majesty’s Government. Nothing, he explained, had occurred to
cause the Government of India to alter the views regarding the proposed
partition of Persia expressed in their despatch of September 1899, and he
urged the Secretary of State to permit the Government of India an opportunity
of taking into their consideration any conclusions which might have been
formed either by the Defence Committee or by His Majesty’s Government.
“ The question ”, he wrote, “ of British policy in Persia, even if at times it
may slumber, is one of such vital moment to ourselves, and is so certain in the
future to assume a much more prominent place on the field of Asiatic politics
than it has yet done, that we feel that it should never for long be absent from
our consideration, but that each successive phase or development of it should
be made the subject of our anxious scrutiny. Though the checks which have
recently been experienced by Russia in her policy of Asiatic expansion mav
be thought to have lessened the chances of an active programme of political
or territorial advance in Persia, we can feel by no means certain that they may
not have the opposite effect; while in the growing weakness and incapacity
of the Central lersian authority it is difficult not to observe the evidences
of a disintegration that may at any time culminate in serious anarchv or
disaster ”. J
No reply had been received to this despatch before Lord Curzon left India.