'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎45r] (94/384)

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Britain ; and he saw no sufficient ground for thinking that there was any inter
national combination to which Britain should look as a buttress to her interests
or influence in that quarter. lie further contended for acceptance of the
principle that, should the line ever be continued south of Baghdad, this could
only be done with British co-operation and consent, and that no terminal port
could be selected unless a similar consent had been obtained and unless the
port was made open and international in character ; and he recommended that,
if these views were shared by His Majesty’s Government, Germany should be
made acquainted with them, lest, when her railway reached Baghdad, she
should complain of having been kept in ignorance of British policy and inten
tions.
The medium of British relations with Arabistan is the Persianised Arab
Sheikh of Mohammerali who combines in
Ara istan. ^ g j n g] e person the authority of a
Persian Governor and the powers of a tribal chief : in the latter capacity he is
practically exempt from the control of the Persian Government.
In 1899 Sheikh Khazal appeared to dread the immediate dissolution of
Persia which might expose his territory to annexation by the Turks ; at the
same time he was afraid that the Persian Government, if it continued to exist,
would shortly attempt to encroach upon his authority in local matters. To
guard against both dangers the Sheikh sought to obtain a secret assurance of
protection from the British Government, but at first none was giren in regard
to either of the contingencies w hich he feared. In 1900, however, it became
known that the Persian Government were anxious to take the customs
of Mohammerah under direct management, and, as there was reason to expect
that this step would be accompanied by a reduction of the executive pow r ers of
the Sheikh—a change which might have had far-reaching political effects—the
British Government were constrained to interest themselves in the matter and
to request that there should be no forcible interference^ with the Sheikh and
that wdthout their consent no change should be made in the management of
the Mohammerah customs. At the time their influence with the Sheikh was
employed to persuade him to deal with the Persian authorities in a reasonable
spirit. In August 1901 the Sheikh received a peremptory order from the
Persian Government to hand over his customs to the management of Imperial
officials, but by various pretexts he succeeded in evading compliance. In
March 1902 he sent a trustworthy representative to negotiate on his behalf
with the Persian Government at Tehran, a step which was entirely in accord
ance with the views of the British Legation. By this intermediary a com
promise was arranged under which, while it safeguarded the executive powers
of the Sheikh and confirmed him in certain privileges, the executive control
of the Arabistan customs was transferred to the Imperial Customs Department.
The new arrangement was brought into effect in September 1902,
Before the conclusion of the negotiations between the Sheikh and the
Persian Government, and for some time afterwards, the situation was fraught
with anxiety to the British Minister at Tehran. In 1899 the Russian Consul-
General at Isfahan, wffiile on a visit to Mohammerah, had made a direct
endeavour to intimidate the Sheikh, and there is little doubt that in 1902 the
Sheikh’s envoy at the capital was subjected to Russian blandishments and
threats which had for their object the establishment of a veiled Russian protec
torate over Mohammerah. At one time Sheikh Khazal appeared to waver, and
Sir A. Hardinge feared that, unless a fuller confidence in the British Govern
ment could be instilled into his mind, Russian influence would soon be found
supreme and active in his entourage. The Minister’s view, that it was expedient
to give the Sheikh an explicit assurance, was in these circumstances strongly
supported by Lord Curzon ; and at length, in a letter written by Sir A. Hardinge
on the 7th of December 1902 under the authority of His Majesty’s Government,
the Sheikh was informed that Great Britain would protect Mohammerah
against naval attack by a foreign pow r er, whatever pretext for such action
mio'ht be alleged, and that, so long as the Sheikh remained faithful to the Shah
and acted in accordance wuth British advice, he would continue to benefit by
the good offices and support of the British Government.