'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎52r] (108/386)

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Baghdad and the Gulf had been discussed, and the German Government had
endeavoured to obtain an interest in the overland Turkish telegraph to Eao.
In 1897 a German Consulate was opened at Bushire, and the many evidences of
the commercial and mercantile activities of so enterprising a competitor increased
the need for an early decision upon the future policy to he adopted by Her
Majesty’s Government.
18. Increasing interest in the political fortunes of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. had also
been shown by the 1 urkish (>overnment. A determined attempt had been made
to fortify the shadowy pretensions of the Ottoman Porte to suzerainty over
Koweit. Intrigues were constantly in progress at Bahrein. During 1898
and 1899 a Turkish corvette had been a constant visitor at LIngah, where
the Sheikh being of Arab descent, Turkish interests were supposed to exist.
Dually, the decisions of the Venice Conference and the proceedings of the
Sanitary Board at Constantinople enabled Turkey to claim an interest in the
navigation of those waters, of which she was not slow to take advantage.
19. These symptoms of external interest in Persia and the Gulf collectively
indicated the policy and ambitions of Foreign Powers, and proved that
in an area, by land and by sea, which Gre it Britain regarded with good reason
as falling within her sphere of influence, her authority was being directly and
increasingly challenged by other nations, who, in proportion as their foothold
became more securely established, would resist any preferential claims upon
whatever foundation in history or on fact they might rest, and would claim
for themselves an equality of right which in theory it might be difficult to
contest. With regard to the advance of Russia, the despatch continued : “we
desire deliberately to say to Your Lordship, with a full consciousness of our
responsibility in so saying, that difficult as we find it in existing circumstances
to meet the financial and military strain imposed upon us by the ever-increas
ing proximity of Russian Power upon the northern and north-western frontiers
of India from the Pamirs to Herat, we could not contemplate without dismay
the prospect of Russian neighbourhood in Eastern or Southern Persia, the
inevitable consequence of which must be a great increase of our burdens ;
while the maritime defensibility of India would require to be altogether
reconsidered, were the dangers of a land invasion to be supplemented by the
appearance of a possible antagonist as a naval power in waters contiguous to
Indian shores. It should be a cardinal axiom of British policy that Her
Majesty’s Government will not acquiesce in any European Power, and more
especially Russia, overrunning Central and Southern Persia, and so reaching
the Gulf, or acquiring naval facilities in the latter even without such territorial
connections. *’
iO. Such being the existing situation and the principles which Lord Curzon
held should regulate the policy of Her Majesty’s Government, the despatch
proceeded to discuss the manner in which those principles should be translated
into action, and the steps which should be taken for the protection of the
common interests of Great Britain and the Indian Empire.
21. Explicit assurances concerning the integrity and independence of Persia
had been exchanged and repeated between the Governments of Great Britain
and Russia, beginning with the assurance entered into by Lord Palmerston and
Count Nesselrode in 1834, and ending with the confirmation of the same by
M. de Giers in 1888. But such pledges were in themselves quite insufficient to
arrest the centripetal progress of Russian influence in Persia, or to save either
the Persian Kingdom, or British interests in it, from the erosive agencies
described. It was therefore necessary to examine the three alternative policies
which presented themselves.
22. The first of these was the policy of a regeneration of Persia by Anglo-
Russian means, but such friendly co-operation was regarded as out of the question,
because Russia was interested, not in the reform of Persia but in its decay,
an illustration of which was seen in the renewal in 1899 of the agreement
entered upon in 1889, by which Persia bound herself not to grant any railway
concessions to any other Power than Russia, except with the consent of the latter
for a period of ten years.