'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎11v] (27/386)

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national existence and the territorial integrity of Persia. A few months
later, on the occasion of the Shah’s visit to London, in the sumnier of
1902, Lord Lansdowne took the opportunity of a private interview to
impress upon His Majesty in person the cardinal points of British policy in
Persia. He explained that the British Government adhered to their oft-
repeated recognition of the independence of the Shah’s dominions. But their
special concern, he added, was with the southern parts of Persia and the Persian
Gulf, and they were determined, should occasion arise, to put forth the whole
of their strength in order to prevent encroachments by other Powers in these
regions. But°the importance of the subject demanded that the views of His
Majesty’s Government should not merely be placed on record in the archives of
the Persian Foreign Office or communicated to the Shah in private audience,
and in May 1903 Lord Lansdowne made a clear and unmistakable
pronouncement to the world in a speech delivered in the House of Lords.
He declared that in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. the policy of His Majesty’s Govern
ment aimed at the protection and promotion of British commerce, and that,
while their efforts were not directed to the exclusion of the legitimate
trade of other Powers, they would regard
Public declaration of British policy. ^ establishment of a naval base or
of a fortified port in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. by any other Power as a very grave
menace to British interests, and would certainly resist it with all the means at
their disposal.
In the course of conversation on the following day the Bussian Ambassador
in London alluded to this declaration of British policy, and Lord Lansdowne took
the opportunity to broach the question of an understanding between the British
and the Russian Governments in regard to the policy of the two countries in
Persia. He explained that the British Government recognised the preponderance
of Russia in North Persia, while they themselves had special interests in the
Gulf, in the Southern ports and in Seistan, and would certainly regard
with serious apprehension any attempt on the part of Russian toconstruct a rail
way from the North which would threaten the frontiers of India on the
Baluchistan side. Count Benckendorf declared that Russia had no intention
of establishing a naval base in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , and that it was most unlikely
that they would undertake any scheme of railway construction such as that
described. He doubted, however, wdiether the situation was yet ripe for any
general discussion as to affairs in Persia,
where it would be difficult to draw a
hard and fast line between British and
Russian interests without raising questions
give rise to trouble. Subsequent overtures made it clear that
the Russian Government shared the views of their Ambassador, and were not
prepared to consider any proposals for the partition of Persia into spheres
of influence.
Overtures to the Russian Government
regarding the partition of Persia into
spheres of influence.
which might
The pronouncements which have been recited were accompanied by delibera
tions as to the steps by which the policy should be enforced. On the 19th
November 1902, a conference was held at the Foreign Office in London, at
British policy in the event of Russian which representatives of the Admiralty
aggression in North Persia. . aa d 0 f the Foreign, India, and War
Offices were present. Three main questions were discussed. The first was formu
lated in the following terms :—“ What action, if any, should betaken in respect
of Persia by Great Britain in the event of war between Great Britain and
Russia—it being assumed that in such a war Russia might have the support
of France, while Great Britain could not count on that of any European
Power ? ” It was held that, in this event, our action should be limited to (1)
the occupation of Seistan, or to holding a force ready for the purpose within
striking distance; (2) the seizure and ocupation by Indian troops of Bunder
Abbas, with the adjoining islands of Kishm, Henjam, and Ormuz ; (3) the
exclusion of any Power from the coast between the isthmus of Maklab and
Musandim point and betw r een Khor Kalba and Hibba, as far as circum
stances would permit; and (4) the protection of British subjects at Bushire,
so long as no serious operations w r ere required at that port.