'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎55r] (114/386)

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r( 3 We bave, tlierefore, decided to send to Your Lordship for communication to Rfs
Maie^ty’s Government, in such manner as you may deem desirable, a Minute on this
aspect of the case which hus been written by His Kxctllency the Viceroy, and with which
^ve desire to record our Complete agreement. We endorse the view expounded by hi™ that,
while there is no objection to the granting of such commercial access to the 1 ersian Gulf, by
Persian railways or otherwise, to Russia or to any other Foreign Power, as their own
mercantile necessities or the expanding reqniiements of Persia may demand, the acquisition
of Political interests or rights by the Russian Government in those quarters would be iraught
with positive danger to the security of the Indian Empire ; and we hope that any such
idea or proposal may continue in the future, as it has done in the past, to meet with the
strenuous opposition of His Majesty^s Government,
Sllinute by His Excellency the Viceroy on Russian ambitions in Eastern
Persia and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .
It may be safely assumed that the great activity now being shown by the Oov-
srnment and by liussian agents in the direction of hborasan, berstan, Sarhad a, d Eastern
Persia in general, arises. parHy from alarm at the success that r* attending the Indian trade-
route to Seistan and the marked revival of British interest m that part of the Indian frontier,
still more from a desire, while Great Britain is otherwise engaged, to accelerate that solution of
the Central Asian cpieetion to which, ever since the apocryphal will ol Peter the Great,
Russian ambitions have been fondly turned, viz., the absorption of Persia, the connection
ft Russian territories by railway with the Indian Occam and t^e aeqms.t,on of a fortified
naval base in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . 1 propose to examine how far the realisation of these
ambitions would bo injurious to British interest,; a conclusion upon which point is»
necessary preliminary to the decision how far they should either be tacitly acquiesced in or
openly opposed.
2 The argument that Russia can safely he permit'ed to secure a maritime entleh for
herself in t! e Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , and that it is desirable that Gre.it Bn am should assis , or at
least not withstand, her in that consumma ion resis upon a Inndamental confusion of
ideas Those who employ it fail altogether to discriminate between commercial pie® and
noliPcal ambitions. It may be urged that, whereas, Russian manufacturers, m their attempt
Fo miin aL™ss to Hasten, markets, art at present compelled to make the long and circuitous
• i tVin TUnpb Spt fho VGdit rfanear. the Suez Canal, and the Red ^ea, befoie they
journey by the Black Sea, th. "a » eou H they be transported by rail-roads
can reach ^“"^'^^t'caspFn to tlfe Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ; although the apparent
value of such a gain would probably be a good deal disenunted m practice by the com-
mrartvely limited trade of Russia (which, however, may admit of a considerable development
Fn the future), still more by R t ^.superior cost "‘Xf m™ Z “"'seriFudy List
satisfaction They can be accomplished-provided the money be forthcommg-by ami-
the r satistacinn. y a , willl Gieat Britain. I am not myself a believer in the
navingLpSes if a trans-Persiun line for many years to come. The country itself is poor
paying w P a f c , ,T a fl . tl ita i or t h P tra fli c . Were the line, however, an open line, it might
and cannot furnish e.ther ^ pnd and the Indian trade from the other,
conceivably attract the Bussian that capitalists might be willing to
which would ena >le i to eu s s . ‘ j capitalist, I should not be fomid among their
come forward and construct 1 ^° U S h ^ while the line remained Persian
5 ^;^ thoJeTf'tho^utWn'Tortmn ^^GreT
llussia, ana tno.e roVl ^i. rpn:*, railwav might terminate on the Gulf m a
Governments sUirat'ons, hut smbject to the Import and Export dues
Persian port, open to t .hould myself reoard such aventure as premature and as
Fperulaldve hF t^higW degf; butt do nZFe anything in it that need uevessarily arouse
r P “ntal advocates of handing over Persia to Russian
ei. 1 Ins, However, irtiu g • what Russia wants. \\ hat she desires is a
iiifluence do not, as a "'““l^ian capital, managed and officered entirely by Russian agents,
railway ot'forLkmLdal,'but fFr political and strategical objects, and terminating in a
csss Sts=r; t rsins’ttrrf ac&Ci
Srirr-liSKa— a ■!»■'>**™- i * ,
4. It is said that ports do not give sea-power, and that a This
would in no wise add to her strength, because ^ ^as no ee ^ q ^ ^ But tbe
might he true as long as Russia consented t( ? r 1 em ^ n J k y of) onl b e Cause shebas few ports ;
answer is clear that Russia has no ee ( , r tbe H ee t will follow with no
and that as soon as her maritime outlets are secured and fortified, the * ^ into the
delay and m proportionate streng^ ^ ^ secured the free passage of the
ICh^a^hetdanellee, when she will have obtained a naval rtatiin somewhere .u tbs