'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎93v] (191/386)

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car t road bevond Sultanabad was considered unnecessary, improvement of the
existing mule track vith caravanserais and local guards being sufficient.
Finally* Lord Curzon expressed bis willingness to bear half the annual expendi
ture estimated by Mr. Spring-Rice, viz , £6,000 for construction and £1,000
annually for the mniutenance of the road.
5 Despairing apoarently of adequate assistance from His Majesty’s
Government, the Bank offered in November 19)1 to re-sell their road conces
sion to the Persian Government, who agreed to take it, for £20,000 Efforts
were then made by the Foreign Office to secure the support of certain British
frms interested in Persian trade to form a company, including the Imperial
Bank, as a solution of the difficulty, hut in January 1902 the Imperial Bank
declared that, while willing to sell the concession to the British Government
or its nominees for the same amount as the Persian Government had offered,
they were unwilling to associate themselves as co-partners with the Euphrates
and Steam Navigation Company or other body. Tn fact they desired to
cancel, not to extend, their ohligitions as regards road construction since such
work did not properly fall within the scope of the Bank’s operations and had
been mainly undertaken owing to the high opinion expressed by Sir H. D.
Wolffe. The British Government was therefore confronted with the option of
buving the concession or allowing it to be sold to the leisian Government.
6. The latter alternative was fraught with considerable danger to
British interests. Since 1900 Russian influence, in consequence of the loan
given in that year to Persia, had been in the ascendant and everything pointed
to the conclusion that the Russian Government desired to open up the south
to Russian trade and to secure the possession of a road from Kazvin to
Sultanabad and thence to the Karun. They already held a concession for a
road from Kazvin to Hamadan, only 70 miles from Burujird. The subsidised line
of Russian steamers to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. had begun to run, the Resht-Kazvin
road had been completed. The new Director of the Banque d’Escompte had
been instructed by M. de Witte to secure by every means in his power the
construction of the Azerbaijan road. It was highly probable that the road, if
sold to the Persian Government, would be re-sold to the Russian Government
as the price of further financial assistance only obtainable from Russia The
acquisition of such a road by Russia would be extremely detrimental to British
interests for all the trade carried on between the capital and the northern pro
vinces beyond and the south on the one hand, and the south-east and south
west of Persia on the other, passed along the Tehran-Kum section. The routes
from Bushire and Ispahan and from Bunder Abbas, Baluchistan and Yezd met
at Kashan between Kum and Ispahan, that from the Karun through Luris-
tan and Burnjird joins the great southern and south-eastern road at Kum; and
the whole traffic between the various ports of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. and the southern,
south-western and south-eastern provinces thus passes along the Kum-Tehran
road. The importance of maintaining our influence with the Lurs and
Bakhtiaris had long been recognised. The acquisition of the road by Russia
would destroy what influence we had, especially if the Kum-Ispahan section
were also to become Russian, and the Russians were to use the British Bakhtiari
road (from Ispahan to Ahwaz) as a means of extending their influence with the
Bakhtiaris.
7. In this connection and with reference to the telegram of the 19th June
1901, on the 17th December 1901 the Secretary of State telegraphed stating
that a suggestion had been made to amalgamate the Bank’s interests with those
of the Karun navigation and Shuster-Ispahan roads and that Government aid
was a sine qua non. The Foreign Office proposed a subsidy of £1,500 a year
towards the Karun navigation and £1,000 or £1,500 for five years for road con
struction on the understanding that £900 would be paid annually fiom Indian
revenues in the former case and £1,000 in the latter.
On the 25th December 1901, Lord Curzon replied that, the question of the
Karun subsidy of which Indian revenues had been relieved should be consider
ed a separate one from that of the road construction on account of which the
Government of India were prepared to contribute a moiety of the subsidy up to
a maximum annual sum of £1,000. His Lordship objected to contribute