'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎135r] (274/386)

On behalf of the Foreign Office—
Sir T. Sanderson and Mr. Maxwell.
Sir A. Hardinge, His Majesty’s Minister at Tehran, also attended.
It was agreed that the instructions to the British Naval Officer Command-
ing in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. as to the circumstances in which His Majesty’s Gov
ernment would consider it expedient to occupy the islands of Kishm, Hormuz,
and Henjam sufficiently indicated the course which he would be called upon
to take in the event of Russian aggression, and that it was not desirable to
add to his responsibilities by supplementary instructions providing for contin
gencies in which it would be better that he should refer home.
The discussion then turned upon the steps which it might be desirable to
tahe for improving Bassidore as a naval station, and in particular on the
expediency of connecting it by a short cable with the telegraph between Jask
and Bush ire.
Admiral Custance explained that for naval purposes no extension or
improvement of Bassidore was really necessary. He stated that, if the Russians
obtained a footing on the shores of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , it would be necessary to
increase the British naval force, but that the ships would work from Bombay or
Karachi as a base, that all that they would require as regards the Persian
Gulf was freedom of access and an anchorage. Por this latter purpose Bassidore
was sufficient as it st^od, and although it would undoubtedly be an improve
ment that it should be provided with the means of telegraphic communication
with India, this was not a matter of any urgency.
Some discussion then took place as to the steps which might advantage
ously be taken to maintain our claim to Bassidore, and perhaps to extend the
present limits in the direction of the old Portuguese settlement. It was
thought that there could be no objection to repairing the ruined buildings
and the rifle range, and that any unobtrusive steps which were practicable
might be taken to extend our limits towards Singao and the Portuguese
settlement.
Sir T. Sanderson suggested that with the present range of modern rifles
it would not be unnatural that fresh butts should be erected in that direction.
As regards the possible influx of traders into Bassidore for the purpose of
avoiding the stringent customs regulations which were being introduced at
Lin gab, it was thought better, on the whole, that such immigration should be
discouraged. It was clear that, if the trading settlement assumed any
importance, the Persian Customs would endeavour to exercise control over it,
and a conflict of jurisdiction would arise. Sir A. Hardinge expressed his
opinion that he should have no great difficulty in silencing any claims that
might be raised on this point by the Persian Government, but he admitted
that the matter was not likely to escape the observation of the French and
Russian Consuls at Bushire, and that their Governments might make it a
subject of awkward and inconvenient counter-claims.
There was some conversation about Ras Musandim, the extreme point of
the promontory on the opposite (Arabian) coast, which oilers some excellent
anchorages, and which it is very important to keep out of the hands of any
other European Power. It had for a longtime been the policy of tlm Gov
ernment of India to regard Ras Musandim and the Sheikh of the district as
being under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Maskat, who was considered to
be practically in dependence upon us, though nominally independent. Now,
however, that the Erench had had some success in establishing a rival influence
at Maskat, and had even obtained at one time the lease of a coaling station,
of which we had only obtained the cancellation by very strong action, it
seemed preferable that the Sheikh of Musandim should be treated as inde-
pendent. There was, however, a certain amount of danger that some Russian
or Erench Agent should conclude a secret arrangement with the Sheikh.
On the whole, it seemed better to avoid any pronouncement as to the
political status of the Sheikh, but to keep careful watch, and, as far as possible,
cultivate friendly and confidential relations with him.
T. H. SANDERSON.