'SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS AND MEASURES OF THE VICEROYALTY OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN THE FOREIGN DEPARTMENT. I. JANUARY 1899-APRIL 1904. II. DECEMBER 1904-NOVEMBER 1905. VOLUME IV. PERSIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.' [‎138r] (280/386)

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this vessel to remain on hoard of her in ordinary circumstances. We are also
aware that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have more than once
declared their objection to any sea-going armed vessel being in commission
unless she be under the control of the Admiralty. We trust, however, that we
may be able to adduce arguments which will show that the time has come to
change the policy hitherto adhered to in this matter.
2. We apprehend that the objections of the Admiralty will be to the effect
that when in 1862 the Indian Navy was converted into the non-combatant force
now called the Loyal Indian Marine, the Loyal Navy undertook all those
duties up to that time performed by the Indian Navy, which could not be
carried out by a non-combatant service ; that for this purpose certain of Ilis
[Majesty’s ships are maintained in Indian waters, towards the cost of which
India contributes a subsidy ; that if the Government of India are not satisfied
that the subsidised vessels are adequate for the due performance oi the duties
referred to, it will be possible to consider the question of. increasing their
number on the understanding that the subsidy paid, by India will be corre-
spondingly increased; that the main object of abolishing the Indian [Navy was
to consolidate naval authority in Indian waters, and that to allow a sea-going
vessel to be armed but not under the orders of the Admiral commanding His
Majesty’s East India squadron would be to introduce a divided authority
which would be inconvenient and dangerous ; that an armed vessel not com
missioned by the Admiralty would have no status and be little better than a
pirate; and finally that the ships of the Loyal Indian Marine have duties to
perform for which they were intended, and for which they are very useful, but
which are in no respect of a combatant nature. We will endeavour to meet
these objections in detail before we proceed to state the reasons w bicli have led
us to make our present representation.
3. First as regards the employment of His Majesty s ships in Indian
waters and the contribution paid by India towards their maintenance, we have
no desire to interiere with this arrangement in any vay; the sums paid
annually by India are intended to cover both the extended duties which are
included in Lord Losehery’s definition in 1895 of the term “ Indian purpose,
and also those minor duties of policing the coasts, which are performed in the
Australian colonies by colonial ships ; we do not propose oi desire to relieve the
Koval Navy of any of those duties in so far as they are performed by them.
Nor do we wish to urge the need for an increase to the subsidised squadron, for
although, as u r e shall show presently, we‘consider that the work done by those
ships in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. might with advantage be supplemented by some
further force, we are of opinion that this object can be fully attained by the
vessels now at our disposal provided they be used to the best advantage. 8 °
the objection that a dual naval authority in Indian waters could not hetolera cc
we reply that we should be far from suggesting such an impracticable arrange
ment. We do not propose that any vessels of the Indian Marine should carry
an armament in time of peace, except those told off for such special ^service
as the policing of the Persian Gull ; while on such service they shou dbe as
complctelv under the control of the Naval Commanderdn : Chief as is H.M>.
Sphinx—ihe special Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. vessel. The administration of such vessels
would of course he under the Government of India, but there would e b 0
more inconvenience or anomaly in this than there is in maintaining a Jintisli
Armv in India under the control of the Governor-General, but administered
under the orders of the War Office, or in, placing a contingent of the Indian
Army under the AV^ar Office for a particular service, or in including saf ois an
marines in a force, under a general officer in the field.
4. When questioned on this subject by the Loyal Commission on Indian
Expenditure in 1896, Vice-Admiral Sir W. A.. Kennedy, lately Naval Com-
mander-in-Chief on the East Indian station, objected that unless commissioned
as men-of-war, and flying a flag and under the orders of the Admiral, armed
vessels would have no status and could not be regarded as anything better ran
pirates. We have already stated that we should never propose that armed
vessels should cruise about Indian waters without any control by the Admiral,
but in our opinion putting vessels under the Admiral is a a cry dineient t 1113 o