Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎10r] (19/290)

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General Radcliffe said that General Milne had suggested arming
them with all the arms and ammunition we could spare, and he
himself thought this should be done.
Mr. Kidston drew the attention of the Conference to a telegram
from the C.G.S., India, No. 913, M.O. 3, in which it was stated that
all property of British subjects throughout Russian Turkestan had
been confiscated by the Bolsheviks, except in the dominion of the
Amir of Bokhara, who had asserted his independence and increased
his army, which is now estimated at 70,000 men.
He suggested that the Amir of Bokhara might possibly be
encouraged to step into Trans-Caspia as we stepped out.
The Chairman pointed out that the country people on that side
were Uzbeg Tartars, and the town people were Sarts, neither of
whom had any connection with Turcomans ; besides, the country
between them and Bokhara was in the occupation of the enemy.
General Radcliffe agreed that it was impossible for the Amir of
Bokhara to step in, but suggested that it might be possible for the
Afghans to push up and fill the vacuum.
The Chairman said that the Amir of Afghanistan was an exceed
ingly cautious man, and that every attempt to get him to display active
interest in this matter had hitherto failed. He realised that if he
once went out into Trans-Caspia he would immediately be at war
with the Bolsheviks, but, the Chairman thought, an alliance between
Afghanistan and the Amir of Bokhara was more likely.
General Cox said that las far as the Military Department of the
India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. was concerned, they were reluctantly inclined to agree
with the War Office that withdrawal was necessary, but he suggested
it should take place under certain conditions. He thought that
Genera] Malleson should retire on to Meshed ; this would involve the
force again coming under the control of India,
The Chairman asked if he had thought of having an advance
base at Kuchan. At the time of his visit to this place, the Khan
had a quasi-independent position, and it occurred to him that, with
outposts at Bujnurd or Kuchan, or both, a Bolshevik invasion of
Persia would be rendered much more difficult.
General Cox replied that outposts at Bujnurd or Kuchan might
be feasible. In any case, the withdrawal ought to be deliberate
enough to give us time to strengthen the hands of the Turcomans,
and, before leaving, General Malleson should try to get hold of the
German prisoners. It would also be necessary for him to make
payments sufficient to satisfy the railway, and to prevent the
possibility of its being closed down before the force had been
withdrawn.
He pointed out that when General Milne returned to Meshed
his connection with the Caucasus would be severed, and Sir Charles
Monro could not support more men than the 1,500 at present under
Malleson’s command.
Mr. Shuckburgh referred to a telephone message from the
Secretary of State for India received on the 7th February, and the
Chairman read it to the Conference. It said :—
“ 1. Military opinion in Paris is anxious to maintain Malle
son’s force where it is and supply him with the reinforcements
he asks for.
“ 2. It is no use attempting this unless we can see our way
to the essential concomitants of financial aid.
“ 3. Mr. Montagu has always been of opinion that
Malleson’s maintenance in Trans-Caspia might lead to grave
embarrassments, while the chances of securing a stable Govern
ment seemed, and seem, small. Rather than entrust the Com-
[987]—180 B 2