File 3443/1914 Pt 2 'German War: German emissaries to Afghanistan' [‎54r] (116/490)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government]
THE WAR.
COA'iTDEN'iTAL.
[September -S.j
SECTION 6.
[140220] No. 1.
Mr, Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—[Received September 28.)
(No. 111.)
Sir, Tehran, September 1, 1015.
MUCH as it has been talked of, the definite resignation of Ain-ed-DowLek’s
Cabinet on the Oth July came as a slight surprise to most people, as he had been
apparently making a stronger stand against the Democratic attacks on Farman Farma
for two or three days previously. Nor am I quite certain even now, a month after the
event, exactly what his reasons were, but the general opinion is that his Highness,
being one of those who do not believe in the existence of two kings in Brentford,
hoped that by sacrificing Farman Farma he would be brought back to office by the
grateful Democrat. During his short tenure of office Ain-ed-Dowleh seems to have
endeavoured to do what Hussein Hilmi Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. and other Grand Viziers failed to do
with the Committee of Union and Progress in Turkey, i.e., bend the Democrats to his
will; but, like the Turkish statesmen, he eventually discovered that if he was to retain
office it must be as servant, not as master. All the time he was professing to the Russian
Minister and myself his earnest desire to serve our interests, which he always admitted
were identical with those of Persia, but always failed—out of fear of offending the
pro-German Democrats—to give practical effect to his professions until just before the
fall of his Cabinet, when he permitted the arrest of an obscure German agent
proceeding to Meshed.
M. de Etter and I called on his Highness on the morning after his resignation and
give him to understand that if he wished to resume office without Farman Farma he
could no longer count on the financial support which the two Powers were ready to
afford him. Farman Farma had been attacked because, in virtue of his office, he had
been the instrument of such mild measures as the Cabinet had taken to check German
intrigues, and if his Highness now sacrificed him to Democrats—i.e., German clamour
—our Government could only regard it as a German victory and Ain-ed-Dowleh as an
instrument in the hands of the pro-German party.
Having demolished Ain-ed-Dowlehs Cabinet, the Democrats had to find a
substitute. I need not weary you with the list of their futile efforts, but it will be
enough to say that at his second attempt Mustofi-ul-Mamalek succeeded on the
19th August in presenting to the Medjliss as heterogeneous a Ministry as e\ei sat at
the same Council table. Mustofi himself represents the Democrats—not that he is one
at heart, but because he cherishes the fantastic belief that if Russia would consent to
remove her troops from Kasvin and elsewhere in Persia, public opinion would pass
from bitter hatred to warm affection for the northern neighbour. He can therefore be
trusted to keep open the sore between Persia and Russia. Vossugh-ed-Dowleh an
Sipahdar, on the other hand, are considered to be nothing but Russian agents, wmle
Ala-es-Sultaneh represents Great Britain, and the presence of these three is to secure
our tolerance, if not our support, of the combination. With Muin-el-Vezarek as his
“chef de cabinet,” Motesham-es-Sultaneh can be trusted not to compromise tie
Government with us, while Assadullah Khan seems to have been thrown m o
strengthen the “ English ” element in virtue solely of his knowledge of the language.
The others scarcely count. , „ , . , ^ i ,i
The Russian Minister and I have, of course, been accused of having prolonged the
crisis, but the accusation is unjust, for the simple and obvious reason that our interests
would have been better suited by the installation of any Cabinet except a 1 ank y
democratic and pro-German one, and that, as events showed the Democrats covdd not
achieve. On two occasions we made endeavours to induce the Shah to use hisintluence
a„d terminate the crisis, but His Majesty was too much under the influence of his
German-paid entourage—it is alleged that he himself has not be ® a , i |
inducements of this character - to listen, and 1 have some reason to think that His
Majesty’s eyes were only opened to the “ German peril by the insolent behaviom ot
the German consul at Kermanshah (see my despatch No. 110). Meantime we have
succeeded, thanks to the influence of the better-informed press, m creating a body of
opinion among the more educated and substantial classes strongly opposed to t e
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