File 3443/1914 Pt 2 'German War: German emissaries to Afghanistan' [‎132r] (273/490)

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The moderates even would somehow be carried away against us by the present
excitement and it would result in the formation of a Government entTrelv
subservient to German interests and reckless enough to carry out the German
intensions by sending into Afghanistan Persian Sgents. To that our “ply
would presumably have to be occupation of Tehran and also an endeavour to
seal whole of the frontiers of Afghanistan. enueavour to
endeavo'nrTnfto 11 tnrnTeT 011 qU - ite different lilies and shoM
endeavour (o) to turn the local feelings against the enemy, and (b) avoid
increasing the anti-Bntish feeling in Persia which at present eists j
As regards (a), an admirable object lesson is furnished by the Turkish
incursion. Its result was to reawaken against the Turks latent hostili v of
G,e Persians and to make the much talked of jehad a complete failure
Germans or rather Wassmuss with his plan of attack on Bushire may (also ?)'
render their cause similarly disastrous); and proof is that efforts are
now being made by the German Minister to induce Wassmuss to return
to lehran just as an appeal was made by the Turkish Ambassador to Raouf
to withdraw to Turkey. Presumably now Bushire ought to be in a
position to defend itself and I can think of nothing that would be more helpful
to us than (Wassmuss?)’s attack. We should in another direction endeavour
to utilise press and with that object in view I have just been enabled to make
arrangements by having had some funds placed by His Majesty’s Government
at my disposal.
W e should, as regards (S), avoid any overt action against Germans and
should invariably take action through the Persian Government. In this
direction the present Cabinet has done something and I have succeeded in
getting strong instructions despatched to the Governors of Sistan and Kerman
to hold up emissaries of the enemy and disarm their followers but whether
these instructions will be carried out effectively depends upon the support we
can give them. This is like everything in Persia a question of money more
than anything else. The value of this weapon has been well understood by the
Germans and since my arrival here in the middle of April I have every reason
to believe that the enemies’ missions here have disposed of at least £50,000
while the agents of the Germans in the provinces of Persia appear to be pro
portionately well supplied. Our policy until quite recently has on the
contrary been not to use money on any scale compared to this, except in
Southern Persia, but I feel that if I can be granted, say, £5,000 a month and
if our reluctance to employ these means is now overcome much can be done
to stimulate the courage of the Persian Government and its supporters of (?)
party in Mejlis and also by subsiding some of the local papers to cause a
veering round of public opinion in our favour.
At any rate experiment (?) (when compared with?) action which I
cannot but regard as certain to produce most regretable results is worth trying.
At all events it is not a costly method and in the event of its failure does
not preclude us from the possibility of trying the more drastic measures con
templated by you which latter, moreover, could, in no circumstances, I appre
hend, be undertaken except after consultation with Russia.
I am repeating your telegram No. 622 S. of the 2nd instant, as also the
above message to the Foreign Office, London.
'
, Telegram P., No. 93 C., dated (and received) the 5th July 1915.
From—His Britannic Majesty’s Consul for Sistan and Kain,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Depart
ment, Simla.
Please refer to Foreign and Political Department’s telegram, 623 S. of
the 2nd July. In the first place long before reinforcement(s) are able to reach
Robat, Germans are likely to enter Kainat. I will use my best efforts with
British Afghan eamelmen, who have been recommended to me by transport
contractor, in the event of any Germans proceeding to frontier.