Coll 6/45 'Nejd-Transjordan Frontier Affairs.' [‎200v] (407/1040)

_ A -i it clear that there would be acute differences of
our draft on the 24th Api cedure contemplated in it and the definition of
rJiit 1 ®
opinion both m reg
ard to the proceou
extraditable offences.^^^^ Qf Friendship alld “ Bon-Voisinage ” having been
completed in the interval, it was
decided to leave the contentious subject of extra-
dition m
abeyance and to start discussion of the draft Treaty of Friendship fcW®
abeyance^a^ ^ ^ ^ on the hnes 0 f that prepared at Amma.
t u C 2 Srd AnriT This draft was also on the lines or tnar prepaieu ar Amma.,
In Fehruatrsubiect to modifications resulting from Colonial Office telegram
111 feDriiaiy, buujo XTi rrV. Prtm mission or and somp, fnrtlior
t 42 ™ r cret SU o U flhe l ilirA^rf’to 'the High'Commissioner and some further
^eciot, ux rr7i fj.— n QT , r ,r, T 1 a-PTnpnt of this treaty were the
No
minor amendments.
arrangement
remainder
The wording and
subiect “of v^7 close discussion during the remainder of the conterence. We
eventually reached almost complete agreement, except as regards article 2 on a
text which was collated by experts in Arabic, including Fuad Bey and Taufiq Bey
ear yon the 4th May, before the general meeting that morning.
8 I now turn to the Arbitration Protocol. Before the mission arrived, I
had satisfied myself that in our anxiety at Amman in February not to get too far
from the Saud'i-Iraq texts we had adapted proposals the practical working of
which would be very difficult. I therefore prepared, in agreement with Colonel
Cox and Taufiq Bey, a revised draft, which still contemplated recourse to
arbitration at the option of eitner party, but which laid down an orderly
procedure including provision for the nomination of the piesident of the board
by a third Power, not specified, in the event of the parties failing to agree on one.
The Arabic of this draft was handed to the Saudi delegates on the 30th April.
9 . After the draft protocol had been thus put forward, Colonel Cox and I
became alive to the danger which might result if each party were given unlimited
freedom to bring the other compulsorily to arbitration on any question affecting
their relations. It was obviously desirable to avoid any possibility of questions
like Maan-Aqaba and frontier delimitation being submitted to arbitration of the
kind contemplated and it seemed equally desirable to guard against frivolous or
petulant recourse to it under general treaty clauses dealing with the broad
principles of collaboration. In a general discussion on the 1 st May we led up to
n modified proposal, which we reduced to written form next day, that questions
under specified articles of the Hadda Agreement and the new Treaty of Friend
ship should be made arbitrable at the option of either party but that all others
should be submitted to arbitration only by special agreement. The Saudi
delegates on the 3rd May demurred to the proposal to establish two categories and
to our surprise now plumped for arbitration by special agreement in all cases.
It appeared to me that, so far as His Majesty’s Government were concerned, this
would give them all that they required as a safety valve in the event of the Saudi
Government persisting in unreasonable complaints that Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan had not
fulfilled obligations and invoking the guarantee of the mandatory power. Colonel
Cox agreed and Taufiq Bey was satisfied. Complete texts of the relevant article
of the Treaty of Friendship and the Arbitration Protocol were then agreed upon.
10. Up to the eve of the final discussion on the Arbitration Protocol, the
k° W President of ^an arbitration board should be appointed, in
" ^ 1 to present difficulty. I was unwilling to
m
11 .
When we
M relevant po
life had to,
- jfjft of the Tn
& Protocol. 1
i so rapid
case of non-agreement, continued
propose formally that His Majesty’s Government should be named as the third
owei, as, though obviously suitable, they will always be identified more with
?? e xr n Wlt A th T other ‘ \ broached the suggestion privately to Fuad Bey on
6 a u’ 1 expected, he demurred to provision in the protocol for
° n HlS Ma J est y ,s Government. The King, he said had every
nnmilaof m t ^® 11 im P^ rtl ality, but a public assignment to them of the role of
overcomp K W a 0 H^i be ^^Gued. I suggested that this difficulty might be
that in oaL nf If °^ ia ^ lc if necessary in semi-official letters only,
Maiestv’q Cnvprr ? 6 i 6 f 1 Government would accept the mediation of His
ffiSmPPW t e ev £ nt 1 dld not P* rsue this suggestion. At the
should bT mfdP fn^ ^ M 7 Fuad Bey sim P 1 y P^posed that no provision
arbitration ffi d ,nPP?Il hlrd ' Pai> y T 111111 ^ 1011 - As we had already agreed to
thL It ^uLrfd n C 0 llea g es and 1 decided to acquiesce in
reasonable P fronnik lf a a time > the Saudi Government refused
n the wrong' as if ^ 9 P resid ® n B they would put themselves as much
^ We had pomp 1 T 6 ! 1 f e 1 aS 0 j lab ] e P ro P°sals for the arbitration itself.
reached artlcl t f ^ d l aft Extradlt ion Treaty on the 2 nd May.
it was obvious that an agreement regarding the
liting of the c
l»f Friendship, w
tome working
mrdtothiswf
ieiitie way t.
vMinmvtele
ptiiofAnglo-f
11 do not know
iiffcMhM
ptmique i
pi®; and althf
atfofFriendsh
lik
¥ I enclose tra
Nib, as col
pacyinthes
in Engli
which I
M I gave