Coll 17/15(1) 'Perso-Iraq Relations: Persia-Iraq frontier; Persia's claim in the Shatt-el-Arab' [‎73r] (156/961)

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the whole of the river would have been a manifest infringement of neutrality, since the Porte had
dec ared itself neutral The Porte itself had not claimed exclusive sovereignty over the river
Instinctively faithful to the natural solution of the median line, the frontier, even after iqiT
reverted to what it had previously been A modus vivendi was then established between the
Ottomans and the Persians as we are told by Sir Arnold T. Wilson, the second British Commissioner
of S 14 ’ Jif 7 \ pl 7 e ui he fron 7Tj as far as the sea ' alon & the mum aqua,
in the middle of the channel. Tradition and old custom thus proved stronger than the new text
How, then, can there be any question now of the simple application of the Erzerum line when
the inconsistency between the two texts was such as to create a resistance which rendered whollv
nugatory two texts entirely unconnected with the Treaty of Erzerum—namelv the Convention
and Declaration of London of July 29th, 1913, between Great Britain and the Porte ?
If you will now be good enough to turn from the river frontier to the land frontier you will
find that the Constantinople Protocol also deprived Persia of extensive territories which were not
affected by the Erzerum clauses. These territories have an approximate area of several thousand
square kilometres. They include, inter alia, going from north to south, a fertile district traversed
by the Sirvan, and then an oil-bearing region. This latter region, indeed, led to a curious reservation
Article VII of the Constantinople Protocol of 1913 says that the concession granted by the Imperial
Persian Government in 1901 to William Knox d’Arcy, and later ceded to the Anglo-Persian
Oil Company, "shall remain to quote its actual words—“ in full and unrestricted force
throughout the territories transferred by Persia to Turkey in virtue of the provisions of the present
Protocol . . The text itself reveals its own significance. It does not merely delimit the
frontier in virtue of the Erzerum Agreement; it goes far beyond the bounds of that Agreement
by itself making transfers which, as you may judge, are of great—indeed, capital—importance.
Thus, both on the river frontier and on the land frontier, very material changes were made
in the boundaries, between 1847 and 1913, from the Erzerum Treaty to the Constantinople
Protocol. They were not submitted to legislative sanction, as the law of the period required.
Hence they have no more value in international law than in municipal law. It is therefore our
right and duty to regard them as non-existent.
Such was the situation when the great war broke out, even before the Delimitation Commission
had completed its task.
Despite her declared neutrality, Persia became the scene of hostilities. On the conclusion
of peace, she joined the League as an original Member, with her frontiers as they then were,
unchallenged by any State. Since then, she has not extended her territory by moving those
frontiers. She cannot imagine that she will meet with a refusal to recognise the position as it existed
when the 1913 Constantinople Protocol was drawn up, a position from which she was ousted by
the proceedings of an irregular Commission which, in 1914, had not even succeeded in carrying
out the whole of the juridically valueless mandate conferred upon it under a Convention that
was invalid, since the consent of both parties, necessary for its conclusion, had never legally been
secured.
I would like to stress this point that, from 1847 to 1912, and then in 1913. the agreements
necessary to modify the territorial situation were never concluded, because there was never any
joint consent in the forms required by both municipal and international law between Persia and
the Sublime Porte; it is self-evident that where there is no joint consent there can be no contract,
either private or public.
Persia has no intention of asking for a revision of existing treaties. That would lequne a
special procedure which, in our case, it would be a grave mistake even to mention.
Nor does Persia intend to demand abrogation of agreements she has signed in the past, V^ c . n
though, should such agreements have been concluded, there would be numerous xeasons loi eir
annulment. * . _ .
Our purpose is merely to point out that, as between Persia and the Ottoman Empire, ere
has never been that joint consent which is required, in accordance with the law in force a ■ e various
periods, for the very existence of a contract. The Council will realise the importance o is s a e
ment. It shows the real nature of Persia’s right which could never be affected by any acts—even
freely undertaken—which have only the appearance of contracts. ,
In these circumstances, Persia cannot admit that her right should be con es e
(1) To the application of the status quo existing before 1913 along her land frontier
where the 1913 demarcation and its application in 1914 entailed grea ern or a
to the transfer of points then in its occupation; . , rvUrWiP nf fhe
(2) To equal sovereignty, on her water frontier over the river up to the mi
Shatt-al-Arab, divided along the median line of the channel between e p
Iraq and Persia.
Along the land frontier you will have noticed that the 1913 Protocol disregards the E
Treaty in arbitrarily taking the frontier along alignments other than all
mountains and waterways, which mark the points from which Persian g y
sllf time kept watch on raiding tribes. between the two riparian States,
kesaii As for the water frontier, I should like to point out that, as prnialitv of the two
both Members of the League, no other regime is applicable excep , , after passing
sovereignties up to midstream, a solution of the problem w ^ c 15 a . ,1 twentieth despite
unchallenged throughout the nineteenth century, it continued o su s retained the same
the Constantinople Protocol. Even after the 1914 delimitation, Persia, m fact, retained ttie
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