Coll 17/15(1) 'Perso-Iraq Relations: Persia-Iraq frontier; Persia's claim in the Shatt-el-Arab' [‎74r] (158/961)

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-our memorandum rt appears admits as much. Thus, the instrument known as the Treatv of
Erzerum is a valid text of which the others represent merely the execution, by fixing a frontier
hne, which, it appears, gave rise between 1847 and 1914 to none but natural difficulties th° nnlv
difficulties to which the Iraqi representative has thought it necessary to allude. He adds moreovej
that ratification by a plenipotentiary without power to ratify and'the conclusion, contrary to the
Constitution of an agreement so important as a change in the territorial situation possess bind “
force, since there would otherwise no longer be any security in international relations b
But, in support of this contention, he appeals in vain to texts, to circumstances to facts
to principles; none of these support him. Then he goes into the history of the frontier Although
he claims that the Persians had no right to the eastern bank, he is obliged to admit bv referent
to the Treaty of 1639, demanded by the Turks, that the Persians had advanced as far as Basra
In order to explain how it is that, after waiting for seventy years, the frontier had not vet been
fixed, he refers to the natural obstacles, but makes no mention of the psychological obstacles
the importance of which the Persian memorandum had emphasised by very definite quotations
from the members of the Delimitation Commission. The Treaty of Erzerum prepared by the
Mediating Courts, was to be exchanged, accepted, signed and ratified. The Porte having incorpo
rated 111 it the explanatory note of which Persia had no cognisance, and could not have had
cognisance, the Treaty was not signed—at all events as the Porte understood that act—on pain
of being declared null and void. It is not merely a question of a treaty ratified by a plenipotentiary
exceeding his powers, but of one that was so ratified without having been signed. According to
Iraq, the Porte alone had the right to avail itself of Persia’s non-acceptance of the explanatory
note. That is a mistake. After declaring that such acceptance was to be a condition sins quci fion
the two parties never reached the stage of joint consent. That is a matter, not of nullity, which
is relative, but of non-existence, which is absolute. No confirmation could take place; no confir
mation did take place on either side. When the parties referred to the instrument known as the
Treaty of Erzerum, which had been concluded partly at Erzerum, in 1847, without the assent of
the Porte, and partly at Constantino fie, in 1848, without the assent of Persia, they each interpreted
the words “ Treaty of Erzerum ” in a different way.
Nor is the Protocol of Teheran of 1911, which is to all appearances absolutely regular in
form—since the two signatures appear on the same date beneath the same text—immune from
this same objection of divergency.
As the representative of Iraq very truly said, treaties are dated according to their signature.
Now, it is quite true that, in the Protocol of Teheran, the Treaty of Erzerum is described as the
instrument “ known as the Treaty of Erzerum ” of 1847. But how is it that, in the Protocol of
Constantinople of November 17th, 1913, it is described by Russia as the “ treaty of 1848 known
as the Treaty of Erzerum ” ? That is the key to the misunderstanding.
For Persia, the Treaty is dated 1847; for the Porte, it is dated 1848. For Persia, the Treaty
consists of the text without the explanatory note; for the Porte, it consists of the text plus the
explanatory note. Even at Teheran the two neighbouring nations did not agree upon a single text.
It was only later, between August 2nd and 9th, 1912, at the last meeting but one of the Mixed
Commission of Constantinople, that joint consent was reached. Our memorandum refers to that
text. It stresses its importance. Up to that moment, Persia had not accepted the instrument
known as the Treaty of Erzerum, and up to that moment the Porte had not accepted it either.
If one waits, as one must, for the conclusion of the Treaty until the moment when there is joint
consent, the real date of the Treaty described in turn as of 1847 an d 1848 is neither 1847 nor 1848,
but 1912—and even then without ratification by the executive, notwithstanding Article 9 of the
Treaty, and, moreover, without legislative approval, despite the explicit and absolute provisions
of the Constitution.
The representative of Iraq said yesterday that it would have been necessary to have a clause
containing the explicit reservation that the Treaty must be in conformity with the Constitution,
in order that the assent of Parliament might be taken as embodying the will of the State. I was not
expecting such a statement, which is absolutely contrary to the doctrine and piactice o
contemporary law. The representative of Iraq then hastened to add that the Persian Parhamen ,
which was in abeyance, could not be consulted, as it was not sitting. But the Constitution remame
intact, with this vital article, embodied in the amendment of I9 0 7» the fundamenta ases
of the Constitution cannot be suspended The Mejlis, which was dissolved in December 1911, me
again in December 1914. Iraq replies that it was impossible to wait foi three years. y sue
haste, when, as I have shown, this period of waiting, dating from 1847, amounted to near y seven y
years ? Nor must it be forgotten that the same rule was necessary for the embodiment of tne
Ottoman national will and that the Ottoman Parliament in this case was not m abeyance,
Persian Parliament. And these observations, which would appear to retain their full force if, as
Iraq alleges, the Protocol of 1913 and the froces-verbaux of 1914 were mere y a
—two stages removed, moreover—of Erzerum, possess even greater importance w F ,
that, under the Protocol of 1913, Persia suffered severe territorial losses. e +0
London of July 29th, 1913, is a proof of those losses. I regret that there is no
dwell on that point. I must go on to the second part of my explanations.
TJxc K.'ivcv
The Iraqi representative said yesterday that the frontier could ^ bank
Certain texts, which are, however, becoming rarer and rarer, do p ace e o ^ ver n
but that is quite exceptional, in virtue of a derogation, *k e ^ j aw Hfre doubtful
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but that is quite exceptional, in virtue of a derogation, the value o w m , H ere ’clcmbtful
doubt, according to the lie of the land, custom and the general prmcip e ^ ^ suc j 1
formulas are not enough; what are needed are definite expher ex . be derived from
a boundary ”, the jurist Rivier says at the end of the nineteenth century, will be derived from