Coll 17/15(1) 'Perso-Iraq Relations: Persia-Iraq frontier; Persia's claim in the Shatt-el-Arab' [‎191r] (392/961)

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II.
Despite the efforts of the mediating Powers, the Treaty was followed only bv
intermittent attempts at execution, not directed by the common will of the signatory
States. Prom time to time a partial endeavour was made to delimit the frontier but
without result. Persia did not accept the declaration made ultra vires by Mirza Mahommed
Ali Khan on January 19th/3lst, 1848. The Porte refused to recognise the existence of
the Treaty unless it embodied the substantial concessions contained in the explanatory
note. Neither of the Parties held himself bound, as the Powers observed with a growing
sense that the difficulties were so great as to render success highly improbable. The
absence of agreement as to the explanatory note is referred to in the diplomatic
correspondence , 1 in addition to the natural and, even more, the psychological obstacles
as being the main source of all the difficulties. Witness the following passage :
“ At the same time, it would be highly desirable that the mediating Courts should
take the opportunity to clear up the species of discrepancy which is considered to exist
between the terms of Article 2 of the Treaty of Erzerum and the explanations exchanged
prior to the ratification of the Treaty between the Porte and the representatives of Great
Britain and Russia at Constantinople. . . The insistence of each of the two Parties
on his own interpretation is the main source of the disputes that are delaying the progress of
joint work on the frontier.”
That is an extract from the joint statement addressed by the British and Russian
Commissioners to their Governments . 2 When Lord Palmerston read it, he wrote to the
British Ambassador at St. Petersburg : “ The boundary between Turkey and Persia can never
be finally settled except by an arbitrary decision on the part of Great Britain and Russia ”. 3
Difficulties continued. From time to time an “ arbitrary delimitation ” was made,
but on each occasion it was immediately repudiated. Lord Palmerston found himself
obliged to threaten either Party that might violate the frontier with the provision of “ aid
and support ” to the other Party . 4 Thus the frontier, in establishing which neither State
had secured the consent of the other, could not be fixed.
Years passed, and the Powers became convinced of the rightness of the view expressed
by the Commissioners of 1851 :
“ We are absolutely certain that it is next to impossible to remove the obstacles which
are obstructing the progress of demarcation, in the absence of more direct and decided
intervention on the part of our respective Courts.” 5
Such intervention demanded the stimulus of personal interest. At the beginning
of the twentieth century, Great Britain and Russia were engaged in dividing their spheres
of influence in the Near East. It was necessary for them to define the limits of their
respective spheres, and that involved prevailing upon Persia and the Ottoman Empire
to fix the boundary between them. They accordingly persuaded those States to come to
a direct agreement upon a new procedure. By their “ good offices ” they induced the
Persian and Ottoman Governments, both of which were equally anxious to remove any
possible future subject of controversy in regard to their common frontier, to instruct the
Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Ambassador at Teheran, respectively,
to establish the bases of negotiation and the procedure to be followed in delimiting the
frontier. Those representatives agreed (Protocol of Teheran of December 21st, 1911:
Annex VII) on the formation of a commission consisting of an equal number of delegates
of either Party, who should be furnished with all relevant documents and evidence, and
should be required to establish the boundary Tine between the two countries ; after which
a technical commission would be appointed for the sole purpose of applying on the spot
the final delimitation on the lines laid down by the former commission.
In its letter for the information of the Council with a view to the application of
Article 11 , paragraph 2, of the Covenant, the Iraqi Government has. not thought fit to
mention this Protocol. It is nevertheless of capital importance. Unlike the non-existent
treaty of 1847, the Teheran Protocol of 1911 constitutes a formal and regular undertaking.
It was the more readily concluded inasmuch as it relates to a procedure in two stages .
first, the general tracing of a comprehensive line, and then the fixing of that line on the
ground. The commissioners responsible for the first stage are enjoined to act m a spin
of sincere impartiality on the basis of the clauses of the “ so-called Przerum Treaty conctudea
in 1847 ” or, to be quite accurate, as only the year of the Hegira is mentioned, 111 •
The agreement in nine articles dates from 1847 ; the explanatory note and its acceptance
by the Porte also dates from 1847 ; the so-called ratification of Mirza Mahommed Ah Knan
is dated 1848, Pera, Sefer 23rd, 1264. It follows that the treaty which, according to
Article 3 of the Teheran Agreement, must serve as basis for the Joint Commission s ^ or ?
described in Article 3 as “ the so-called Erzerum Treaty concluded in 1263”, only relates to
the nine articles, leaving out of account the explanatory note. In spite of the express
mention of the year 1263, which definitely confirmed the Persian point of view, tne roite
energetically maintained its opposition. . ^
This uncompromising attitude had its effect on the work ot the Cons i I
Commission (March 12th/25th-August 9 th/ 22 nd, 1912). But Russia, exercising piessure
1 Correspondence respecting the Demarcation of the Frontier between i uikey and Persia, piesei t
both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty, 1865.
2 Loc. tit., page 12.
3 Loc. tit., page 13.
4 Loc. tit., page 13*: Viscount Palmerston to Sir G. H. Seymour, October 11th, 1851,
5 Loc. tit., page 12.