‘Bagdad Ry’ [‎17r] (33/129)

9
40. Subjoined are a few statistics which may he of use for reference :—
Distance.
Estimate.
Tdtul length of line—
Miles.
£
Kr nia to Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , about ..
1,250
Mosul „ „
670
Bagdad ,, „
440
Total distance by River 'figris—
Mosul to Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran.
830
Bagdad to Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran.
505
Total cost of total line (construction), estimated
15,000,000
Total actual cost of Konia-Eregli section, per mile ..
• •
6,000
Traffic, receipts, Anatolian Railway, 1902-1903,
average, per mile
, •
605
Working expenses, Anatolian Railway, 1902-1903,
average, per mile
• .
249
Guarantee (construction), Bagdad Railway, per mile..
..
700
Guarantee (working expenses',, Bagdad Railway, per
mile
290
The most useful Tiiap is in Rohrbach’s “ Bagdadbahu ’ (attached).
June 1, 1905.
(Signed) CLI V'E BIGHAM, Captain.
P.S.—It has been suggested that the Germans may only build their railway as far
as Bagdad, or at some other point higher up the Tigris, and make use of the river as a
means of transport for the remainder of the way to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .
in such a case the general position would appear to be more favourable to us than
an all-German line of railway to the sea would be, but less favourable than if we had
our own Bagdad- Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. section.
The keynote of our military objections to an all-German line is that we are
opposed to the establishment of any new Power on the shores of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . It
is clear that if the Germans finished at Bagdad they would not be at Umkasr or
Koweit—though they might eventually get there. It may therefore be assumed that
a German terminus at Bagdad would strategically be rather less damaging to our
interests than one on the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . Prom the political point of view the situation
would be modified in a somewhat similar degree. The Coast and Desert Arabs and
the Mahommedan pilgrims would not see and hear quite so much of the Germans
if limited to Bagdad as they would if Kerbela and Bussorah were on a German
railway.
Commercially the outlook is less certain. At first it would appear that
Messrs. Lynch and the Sultan would between them control all the river traffic. But
the Germans have already secured in the Convention the basis of a right of navigation
on the Tigris (see paragraph 13), and it is hardly probable that they would not take
care to guarantee themselves in advance from the effects of a British and Turkish
traffic monopoly. Once they had effected this and had their own boats running,
loading and unloading at their own quays, and connecting with their own railway, our
prospects would not look very encouraging.
It is, however, by no means certain that all the German objects would be achieved
by a line that ended at Bagdad.
As has been suggested before, there are probably both military and political
ambitions in their project, and neither of these would be adequately remunerated if
the railway stopped short at an inland town. There would be far less chance of a
German port on the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , of German liners calling there, or of predominant
German influence on the waste lands of Arabia.
Nor would they be so well off commercially as they might have been. They
would be sacrificing the future profits ensuing from the development of part of the
best corn-"rowing lands in Mesopotamia and from the resulting freights, they would not
carry the large pilgrim traffic that comes from Persia and India, it is extremely
improbable that they would secure the British mails with their subsidy, and finally,
they would not be in direct communication with the sea or with the large cities of
Kerbela and Bussorah.
They would also have to bring considerable influence to bear on the Sultan of the
day who might not be llis present Majesty, to so modify their concession as to give
35 a.
35 b.