‘Bagdad Ry’ [‎24v] (48/129)

14
Or, if there is nny possibility of inducing the United States to participate,
the proportion might be —
Country.
Percentage.
Great Britain
...
...
...
...
22
United States
...
...
...
...
22
F ranee
...
...
...
...
... 22
Germany
...
...
...
...
... 22
Minor nations
...
...
• ■ •
• • •
12
100
19. Provision would have to he made to secure to participants propor
tionate shares in the provision of railway materiel for the international propor
tion of the line. It would further bo desirable that arrangements should be
made to pool the receipts of the German, French, English, and International
Companies, and that a mutual guarantee should be given by all the Companies
that they will not establish discriminating tarill's in favour of or against the
trade of individual nations.
20. Such arrangements would concede to the Germans a point which they
were clearly unwilling to yield in the former negotiations; and, provided that
access to Alexandretta by the international line is assured, the Germans, even
if they evaded the Agreement by granting rebates on the Anatolian Railway to
German traders, would not be able to injure our trade on any section of the line
to Konieh, as goods arriving via the Mediterranean would be sent to Konieh as
cheaply by Alexandretta as by Haidar Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. .
21. An arrangement of the nature described above would require the
establishment of a clearing-house charged with the duty of apportioning
receipts and expenditure on through traffic. The management of the clearing
house would be in the hands of a Mixed Committee of the several Boards.
22. If the entire system could be placed under bond Jide international
control, British interests would be adequately safeguarded, but the difficulties
appear insuperable. It is extremely unlikely that that the Germans would
consent to internationalise the Anatolian Railway, while the French would
probably object strongly to a similar arrangement in regard to th5 Syrian lines.
23. On the whole, the arrangement above suggested seems the most
practical at the present time, and it might be defirable to sound the French
Government on the subject.
24. The following is a summary of the proposals:—
{a) Germany to retain control and management of the Anatolian
Railway.
(6) France to retain control and management of the Syrian Railways.
(c) Great Britain to construct, control, and manage the Baghdad-Gulf
section.
(d) The intervening section, with branches and connections, to be
internationalised.
(<?) The internal ional section to be controlled by a Board on which tlie
Great Powers are equally represented.
(/) Materials for the international section to be provided by the Powers
in proportion to their financial participation.
(g) The Powers to undertake not to impose differential rates on the
sections they severally control.
(//) The receipts on the entire system to he pooled and distribuled by a
clearing-house managed by a Committee from the several Boards.
The 4th August 1005. G. S. Clarke.