Manuscript of Persia and the Persian Question (Continued) [‎310r] (619/690)

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Neither can 1 feel any sympathy with Russia
in her lust for territorial aggrandizement, at the
expense of Persia, in the north. Herein I am
actuated by no narrow prejudice of national
jealousy, inasmuch as 1 am profoundly convinced
that England neither want s to possess, nor-ougjjt
to possess,nor ever will possess those territories
herself.^ ifc*; the very pleas which have extenu
ated and justified Russian advance elsewhere in
Central Asia, and which she is always quoting in
self-defence, are wanting here. No one can con
tend that the Persians of Khorasan are a gang of
lawless freebooters like the Turcomans ; that they
are a peril to their neighbours and a scourge to
society. No insecurity of life or property in
Khorasan or Azerbaijan demands the installation
of a military despotism for the coercion of unruly
elements. No sluggish pools of superstition or
prejudice require to bo stirred by the wand of a
European magician. On the contrary, the Persians
are far too timid a people to constitute a danger
to anybody else, and are in many respects quite
as advanced in civilization as the Russians them
selves. Regarding them as a distinct nationality,
resident in the territories which they have occu
pied from time immemorial, under a Sovereign
and with a language, religion, customs, and indi
viduality of their own, lean see no reason for sup
pressing their independent existence and subject
ing them to an alien sway. The Government of
Persia is in many respects bad enough, but
that of Russia is not likely to be so im
measurably superior as to outweigh the claims to
respect which an ancient and illustrious history
and the main conditions of national existence
(even in the absence of a national spirit) combine
to create. A superiority of influence in North
Persia and in the districts coterminous with her
own borders is an advantage to which Russia from
her position is entitled, and which no fair man
will be disposed to grudge her. But influence is
I a different thing from ownership, and where the
one is legitimate the other may be both mis
chievous and unpardonable.
Still more strongly do these observations apply
to her designs upon South Persia and the Persian
Gulf. Here not only would any Englishman pro
test in the interests of dPersia, 4hi 4 wny English.
Government would bo bound to protest in the in
terests of Great Britain. No! plea that the most
sophistical of logicians could devise can be ad
vanced to justify any such proceeding. The
safety of India, which is the first duty of Great
Britain, the pax Britannica that now reigns in the
SoutlnSeas in consequence of her temperate con
trol, the sacrifices that have been made by her in
the pursuance of that end, the utter absence of
any Russian interests for thousands of miles, the
perfect ability of Persia in these parts to look after
herself,are incontrovertible arguments against any
such aggression. It can only bo prosecuted in
the teetli of international morality, in defiance of
civilized opinion, and with the ultimate certainty
of a war with this country that would ring from
pole to pole.
The criticism which I ba£»pass«Biupon Russian
policy th'k>-lotter is no monopoly of English
opinion, but is shared, and would be endorsed, by
the majority of Persians themselves. Political
acumen is one of the gifts with which the Persian
character is most richly endowed, and it is no
varo experience to find a very fair aperfu of the
political situation formulated by men in a com-
paratively humble station of life. The Persians,
from the Shah downwards, are tolerably well
acquainted both with the designs and with the
methods of Russia. They see in her, not the un
selfish champion of distressed nationalities, but
the future enemy of their political liberties, and
their secret sympathies would be almost unani
mously enlisted in the opposite scale. But
they are at once deplorably weak and fatally
conscious of their own weakness. And where
amid a people of finer moral fibre such a con
sciousness might lead to a resurrection of national
spirit and a manly effort for self-redemption, with
the Persians it has the contrary effect of leaving
them despondent and cowed, helplessly awaiting
the catastrophe which they have made up their
minds that they cannot avert. They are afraid
of Russia, and they tell you so. The limit of
their self-sufficiency is that which is permitted
by their fears, and the crisis has never yet oc
curred in history where such a spirit has nerved
a sturdy blow for freedom.
If it be evident^ as mh il in 1ml liinlin'
that Russian policy in S Pcrsia has a hostile object
and aggressive intent, it is, I shall now hope to
show, not less evident that British policy neither
has nor is again likely to have any but the most
opposite characteristics. It is uuom 'than
years since this country was at war with the
reigning Shah—an episode already so buried in
oblivien that nine Englishmen out of ten are pro
bably unaware that it everoocu-rred,while the tenth
will not be able to say what it was about. The
reception twice given to the Persian monarch in
England, the large space that is now occupied in
the public Press by Persia, the vigilant interest
with which our diplomacy in that country is
watched at home, the increasing movement of
Englishmen and English capital towards its
shores, are evidences of a new-born, or at least
re-a rous ed concern in its welfare, and of a con-_
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