Coll 17/7(1) 'Iraq and Palestine: agreement for transit through Palestine of goods to and from Iraq; Baghdad-Haifa railway' [‎73v] (157/1068)

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■■T’
arguments for the construction of the railway were all necessarily of a speculative
or hypothetical character, based on guess-work as to possible future developments.
Had the necessary funds been readily available, it was possible that on the very
long view the construction of the railway would be fully justified. He thought
that no one would dispute that the railway was m itself a desirable thing. He
did not see, however, how the Sub-Committee could really put up a clear and
convincing case for it in existing circumstances
Mr LAITHWAITE agreed as to the difficulties, in existing circumstances,
in the light of the discussion which had taken place, of making any conclusive
case on political grounds for the construction of the i ailway.
THE CHAIRMAN thought that the political arguments were too hypo
thetical to justify a recommendation for the construction of a railway. It was
true that its completion might perhaps be a means of bringing Iraq into closer
touch with British influence and might thus counter Eiench mfilti atimi, but that
left out of account development of road and air communication. The general
future appeared so vague that no convincing case could be made out, and he did
not think that the immediate possibility of a deal with the Iraqi Government in
connection with the Iraq railways could be held to be a determining factor.
Economic Aspect.
THE CHAIRMAN stated that the Colonial Office had considered, in consul
tation with their advisers, the economic aspect of this railway. They had come
to the conclusion, for the reasons stated in the Colonial Office memorandum, that
it was unlikely to be a paying concern, and that, as a commercial proposition, the
construction of the railway would not be justified.
Mr. BRIDGES observed that the more fertile portion of the route m
Palestine and Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan was already served by the existing Hedjaz and
Palestine railways. It would be necessary for the Government to give some
guarantee for the Palestine- Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan sector, not only to cover the annual
interest, but against any working loss, and to provide for a sinking tund. bucn
a guarantee should normally be given by the Government through whose territory
a iai g^^ r p as concerne H that portion of the proposed railway which would be in
Iraq, the Treasury appreciated that their holding in Iraq Railways was m any
case an asset of somewhat doubtful value. The Treasury felt more concer
in regard to the liability which would.be incurred in respect or the portion
railway which would be in Palestine and Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan .
Mr. WILLIAMS stated that the High Commissioner for Palestine had
expressed himself in favour of road communication, and that in any even i
understood that he would not be willing that Palestine should accept any tmancid
liability in connection with the railway if it should be built.
THE CHAIRMAN observed that although the Palestine Government might
have some funds which could be made available, Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan , w , ,
territory a longer and much more expensive section of the line would pa8S,
no funds; a grant from the Treasury was needed to make up the
normal expenditure. The liability for this portion would therefore tal *
the Treasury. He did not see how the railway, through Palestine ^ ir
j or dan, could possibly be built without a guarantee from His Majesty s trov
meat, and this, he understood, would present very great difficulty politically.
SIR FRANCIS HUMPHRYS said that the Iraqi Government had it »
mind to raise the money on the security of the oil royalties. The Iraqi t-' 0 ''' ,
ment would, in the next 20 years, receive at a low estimate some 20 million po ^
from these royalties. The desire had recently manifested itself to invest pai
this money in something tangible which would assist the development o ^
country’s communications, such as railways from Baghdad to Mosul ana
Mediterranean. ^ „ n d
He stated that considerable traffic could be expected, both from versi
to Mosul from the Mediterranean, if a through standard gauge-line were bui
Haifa. He had been informed by the Director of the Iraq Railways that tne
of freight from Baghdad to Haifa would work out at about 155. a ton. A o
105. a ton for sea freight from Haifa to London, the through cost per ton w
liter furl
plliai
prtis H

Coll 17/7(1) 'Iraq and Palestine: agreement for transit through Palestine of goods to and from Iraq; Baghdad-Haifa railway' [‎73v] (157/1068)

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Coll 17/7(1) 'Iraq and Palestine: agreement for transit through Palestine of goods to and from Iraq; Baghdad-Haifa railway' [‎73v] (157/1068)

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