Coll 17/7(1) 'Iraq and Palestine: agreement for transit through Palestine of goods to and from Iraq; Baghdad-Haifa railway' [‎249r] (508/1068)

instituted their measures for encouragement of this trade, substantially higher
tonnage under the international transit regime may be anticipated for 1934.
15. It is interesting to compare these totals with those given in
Messrs. Rendel, Palmer and Tritton’s Haifa-Bagdad Railway survey report
?p. 129 of vol. I), wherein the average cross-desert traffic from 1928 to 1930 was
Itimated at 2,300 tons east-bound (1,700 tons to Bagdad and 600 tons to Persia)
and 2,300 tons west-bound (1,400 tons from Bagdad and 900 tons from Persia).
16. From the Iraqi point of view it is of great importance that the routes
to the Mediterranean should be developed in a manner which will ensure the
maximum benefit to the country. Bagdad was once the leading entrepot market
for Western Persia, goods being imported by sea to Basra, by river to Bagdad
and thence by camel into Persia via Khanikin. During the war the development
of the port of Basra and the construction of the railway from Basra to Khanikin
gave promise of considerable increase in this transit trade; but for the past /
decade the Persian Government have done all they can to eliminate Iraq from 1
Persia’s communications. So far as Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. traffic is concerned, they have 1
largely succeeded, since importations to Western Persia are now mainly consigned
to the Persian ports of Bandar Shahpur or Mohammerah. However, in the
comparatively recent development for freight of the overland routes to the
Mediterranean, Iraqis see some hope of reviving their Persian entrepot market.
This is not merely a matter of transport. The transit trade used to be financed
in Bagdad, and may be said to have been the principal business of the city.
Iraqis do not want it revived by, and for the benefit of, Syrians and the French,
who wish to make Beirut the real entrepot centre. They want it revived by, and
for the benefit of, Iraqis. This applies especially to potential through traffic
via the Rowanduz road, on which the Iraqi Government have spent large sums.
The French mean to eliminate Bagdad altogether from this traffic, and to
transport Persian goods via Nisibin and Mosul with the minimum benefit to Iraq.
Iraqis therefore dislike the French plans to control trans-desert traffic, and,
although the death of King Feisal has removed much of the driving force in
favour of Haim Effendi, they would welcome effective competition by the
Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan route. They are, however, suspicious of a request for a definite
undertaking to promote the development of a particular route, and Ministers are
reluctant to take the responsibility of giving it.
17. From the point of view of the Government of Palestine, the diversion to
Haifa of the trans-desert transit trade is highly desirable. Although as yet
comparatively small, it is one which is capable of great expansion, especially in
the event of relaxation of the trade restrictions in Persia. The advantages to
Palestine which will result from the establishment of the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan route are
-eater than those which will accrue to Iraq. It therefore appears to me that
he Government of Palestine will be wmll advised to proceed without waiting for
an official assurance of co-operation from the Iraqi Government with their
proposals for its development, and especially with the road construction, which
11 shorten it by nearly 100 miles. The delay is playing into the hands of the
rench, giving them valuable time to consolidate their position on the Syrian
ates.
18. It also appears to me only reasonable to accord Haim Effendi the full
ustoms franchise for vehicles, fuel and accessories for which he has applied to
the Government of Palestine, especially as he will deal exclusively with transit
traffic and will not compete in local traffic either for passengers or freight. I his
is no more than his competitors obtain in Syria, and, without official support on
the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan route at least equal to that given on the Syrian route, which is
shorter and more convenient, he cannot hope to compete with the French
subsidised group. He is under no obligation to continue to operate at a loss
via Haifa, and can still make profits via Damascus. The French dare not exclude
him from Syrian routes for fear of retaliation by the Iraqi Government against
the Auto-Routiere. Last year they made many unsuccessful attempts to induce
him to co-operate with them. They would still no doubt be glad to come to terms
with him if only because he is the sole transporter who has yet operated regularly
pp tus Rowanduz route to Persia. If he is denied full franchise in Palestine, it
m very probable that he will join them and abandon the Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan route
altogether. I can see little prospect of developing it without the assistance of
Haim s controlling influence in the transport of Iraq, and, if the motor route
ignominiously fails, it will react unfavourably on the prospects of the railway.