Coll 17/7(1) 'Iraq and Palestine: agreement for transit through Palestine of goods to and from Iraq; Baghdad-Haifa railway' [‎350r] (710/1068)

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in his heart, Hg did not wish to go bnck into mnttGrs which wgtg better, perhnps
left in the past to which they belonged, but he would like to recall the conversation
which he had had with Mr. Churchill (then Secretary of State for the Colonies)
just before he left England to go to Iraq as a candidate for the throne. At that
n^conveisation Mr. Churchill had explained a policy which he had agreed to follow,
and he thought he niight say that, since that date, he had worked out that policy
in all sinceiity and loyalty. He felt now, however, that the stage covered by the
understanding entered into with Mr. Churchill had been traversed, and a new
stage lay before his country. M hat path were they to follow ? For his own part
bearing in mind the close alliance into which he had entered with Great Britain,
he was most anxious that the policy of his Government should be in accord with
that of His Majesty's Government. It was for this reason that he would like to
discuss with me several aspects of the Arab question with which his Government
were confronted.
14- To begin with, they desired to establish a line of communication between
Iraq and the Mediterranean. This could be done either through Syria or
Palestine. The Iraqi Government, however, were puzzled to know "which route
to favour. On the one hand, the manner in which the French mandate had been
exercised in Syria gave them no hope that there would in the near future be set
up in Syria a Government favourably disposed to Arab aspirations; and on the
other hand, although they felt confident of the general sympathy of His Majesty’s
Government, the development of Zionism in Palestine gave rise to ’ many
misgivings concerning the future of the Arabs in Palestine. The Arabs were
being driven out of Palestine and Transjordan Used in three contexts: the geographical region to the east of the River Jordan (literally ‘across the River Jordan’); a British protectorate (1921-46); an independent political entity (1946-49) now known as Jordan , and would soon be quite unable
to withstand the economic and financial strength of the Jews. The potentialities
of such a situation made Palestine unattractive as a route for Iraq’s line of
communication with the sea.
15. These problems could, King Feisal explained, in his opinion all be
solved if the Arabs worked in harmony with British policy, and continued to
enjoy British sympathy and support. His aim was to lay down a policy in
full consultation with His Majesty’s Government, and thereby to obviate" the
possibility of embarking on a course of action which might involve his Govern
ment in serious difficulties with His Majesty’s Government, or even jeopardise
the continuance of the happy relations now existing between the two countries.
For example, there was a growing desire among people in Iraq, and their
representatives in Parliament and the Government, to help the Arabs in Syuia,
and it had been proposed that Iraq, as a member of the League of Nations,
should, in the Assembly, challenge the French application to Syria of the
principles of article 22 of the Covenant of the League. What would be the
attitude of His Majesty's Government towards such a demarche? Again, so long
as Syria remained under a French mandate in its present form, the Iraqi Govern
ment felt obliged to obstruct the development of Syrian communications with Iraq,
and across Iraq with Persia, as they feared that, particularly in the north, any
facilities given for the development of lines of communication with Syria would
be used by the French for the spread of their influence into Iraq. Such a policy
might involve the Iraqi Government in difficulties with France, to which His
Majesty's Government could not remain indifferent. Here again, he would be
glad of my views.
16. I replied that I could not, of course, give an immediate opinion on
the very important issues which His Majesty had raised. I promised, however,
to inform my colleagues of the most interesting and valuable conversation which
1 had had with him, and I undertook that the situation which he had described
should be most fully considered.
Arab Congress.
17. I mentioned also the matter of the proposed Arab congress, and
ex plained the view of His Majesty’s Government that the holding of such a
congress in Bagdad would, in all probability, cause serious embarrassments for
r aq with her neighbours.
18. King Feisal replied that he attached far more importance to working
°nt with His Majesty’s Government a policy which would offer reasonable hope
°1 bringing about the realisation of Arab aspirations than to the congress, and.
provided such a policy could be agreed upon, he would exercise all his influence
to prevent the congress from being held in Bagdad or elsewhere.
[851 a—1] b 2