'Papers relating to transfer of Middle Eastern Affairs to the Colonial Office and creation of a new Department there, 1920-1921, with Cabinet notes of Milner, Montague, Churchill, self, and others' [‎15r] (29/136)

APPENDIX B.
EGYPT AND PALESTINE.
Garrison based on Milner proposal to which
General Congreve objects.
Garrison as known on 30th April, 1920.
Palestine.
1 Divisional Headquarters.
1 .-Sritish Cavalry Brigade. ^
r r x l> • j ) - British Battalions.
2 lndl ' m Infantr y Brigades ( 6Indian BlttaHoB8 .
1 Battery, Royal Horse Artillery, and Royal Horse
Artillery Brigade Headquarters.
2 Brigades, Royal Field Artillery (less 1 Battery).
1 Brigade, Mountain Artillery.
1 Heavy Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery.
1 Armoure 1-Car Company.
Ancillary Troops.
6 Indian Cavalry Regiments.
2 British Cavalry Regiments.
1 Battery, Royal Horse Artillery.
2 Brigades, Royal Field Artillery (less 1 Battery).
1 Brigade, Mountain Artillery.
3 British Infantry Battalions.
10 Indian Infantry Battalions.
2 Indian Pioneer Battalions (1 due to leave).
1 Jewish Battalion.
Ancillary Troops.
Egypt.
.... iv • • r 7 British Battalions.
1 Indian Division ) n i j- u + 4 . r „
i u u iv • • s 9 Indian Battalions.
1 British Division ^ , pioneei . ljattalion .
1 Bi itish Cavalry Regiment.
1 Indian Cavalry Regiment.
1 Battery, Royal Horse Artillery.
1 Battery, Royal Field Artillery.
2 Field Companies, Sappers and Miners.
1 Armoured-Car Company.
Ancillary Troops.
25 Indian Infantry Battalions (11 due to leave as
reliefs now arrived).
6 British Infantry Battalions.
2 British Cavalry Regiments.
2 Indian Cavalry Regiments.
1 Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery (less 1 Battery).
1 Battery, Royal Field Artillery.
1 Brigade, Royal Garrison Artillery.
Ancillary Troops.
APPENDIX C.
From Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 13th February, 1920. (Defeated to
Government of India and Teheran.)
Priority A. Deceived 16th, 11.30 a.m.
(R.) No. 1975. Please see note by Secretary of State for War regarding situation
in Mesopotamia, dated 12th November. General Staff memorandum involves two
assumptions. Firstly, that we have got equivalent of two divisions in this country
and, secondly, that it is easier to hold part of Mesopotamia than the whole.
As regards the first assumption. The actual position is that bulk of British units
in this country are ineffective, whilst India can only maintain Indian units in this
country at Indian establishment, and Gurkha battalions are dwindling. The military
value of the troops at present in this country does not exceed that of one division and
one brigade on a war footing.
Administrative services are being carried on with considerable difficulty, and
continued presence in this country of numbers of Turkish prisoners of war, known
incomplete state of railways, and absence of barrack and storage accommodation involves
expenditure and maintenance of personnel on scale which would otherwise not be
contemplated.
The Doyal Air Force and Light Armoured Motor Batteries, upon which we rely
considerably, are also gravely deficient in personnel. •
On question of post-war garrison, please see my telegrams of 29th September and
21st October. I still adhere to views expressed therein.
As regards second assumption. It is my deliberate opinion we cannot withdraw to
any appreciable extent from the area that we at present occupy without endangering
our position from one end of Mesopotamia to the other.
The abandonment of Mosul, Arbil and Suleimaniyah Divisions would so unfavourably
affect our position in Baghdad and Basrah vilayets as to render our position before long
untenable without considerable reinforcements.