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'Papers relating to transfer of Middle Eastern Affairs to the Colonial Office and creation of a new Department there, 1920-1921, with Cabinet notes of Milner, Montague, Churchill, self, and others' [‎18r] (35/136)

The record is made up of 1 file (68 folios). It was created in 1 May 1920-10 Feb 1921. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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3
rest of Turkey in Asia are still quite indeterminate, and the settlement of
all these problems will be intolerably complicated by the continuance of
Bolshevik interference.
Peace with Russia, even if it were only a transient peace, would be of inestimable
importance. But it may not be possible to conclude peace, or only after protracted
negotiations. And meanwhile the position in Persia may be hopelessly compromised,
unless we take prompt action to save it. We do not want, we never have wanted, to
make ourselves responsible for the government of Persia. But w r e do want to help
Persia to stand on her ow r n legs. If she were to fall into the hands of Russia, or to
become a dependent ally of Russia, our whole position in the East would be gravely
imperilled and the cost of maintaining it immeasurably increased. The immediate
danger is, that, unless we can succeed in propping it up, the present reforming and
pro-British Government of Persia will fall and be replaced by an unfriendly
Government leaning on Russia, or simply by general chaos. This is so serious a
prospect that, in our own interest, even if we had no moral obligations to the friendly
element in Persia, we are bound, as it seems to me, to make every effort to avert the
threatened disaster. And I believe we can perfectly well avert it even now, if we make
it evident by our actions, that we mean to stand by our friends and to do anything
that is practicable to uphold the system of government which we have been helping
to set up. To my mind it is the moral effect of the attitude which we adopt upon the
Government and people of Persia, which is likely to be the decisive factor. It is not
so much an invasion of Central Persia by the Bolsheviks which is the immediate
danger. They may overrun the province of Azerbaijan, and that in itself would be
bad enough. But I doubt, whether they have the means, even if they have
the intention, of sending an expedition against Teheran. The immediate danger is,
that the Persians generally will lose faith in our willingness or in our power
stand by them, and that the Bolshevik elements in the country will thus be
enabled to gain the upper hand. But it is evident that if we have no policy
but that of gradual withdrawal, the Persians are bound to lose all faith. If
after giving up Meshed on the one hand, and being unceremoniously bundled out of
Enzeli on the other, we now retreat first from Kazvin—thus uncovering Teheran—to
Hamadan, and then from Hamadan to Kermanshah, and so on, what can we expect
but that the Persians will give us up and look elsewhere for salvation ? Unless it is
militarily quite impracticable, it would be far better to hold on, at least temporarily, to
the Kasvin, Hamadan, Kermanshah line, and strengthen it, if need be, from
Mesopotamia. But it is no use merely hanging on there, unless we at the same
time help the Persian Government to develop such of its own defensive forces as
can be relied on—the Cossacks being evidently worse than useless. And the
Persian Government is itself anxious to do this ; it may, however, need a further
advance of money for the purpose. But this is not a case, to which our resolution not
to lend any more money to any of our Allies properly applies. It is not primarily a
question of helping an Ally, but of securing our own vital interests in Persia and
saving all that we have already spent on that country from being completely wasted.
A Bolshevik revolution in Persia would involve consequences for the British Empire,
which it would be worth our while to spend not one, but many millions to avert.
The note of the Secretary of State for War (C.P.-1320) raises a number of questions
affecting Mesopotamia other than those which have been referred to above. 1 do not
propose to go into them in this memorandum, which has already run to excessive length,
although on another occasion I may have something to say about them. The question
of the administration of the mandated territories—Palestine and Mesopotamia—is
undoubtedly an important one, and must be considered in connection with the S3 r stems
to be adopted for the future exercise of British authority, or influence, in other Arab
countries—Egypt, the Hedjaz, &c.—and the control of those systems from home. But
these problems, important as they are, do not seem to me ot the same absolute urgency
as the matters with which this memorandum deals. Indeed, it may be doubted
whether they can be properly discussed, till the extent and nature of our responsibilities
in all this region—the boundaries of the mandated territories, the character of the
“mandates,” the future constitution of Egypt, &c.~ assume a clearer shape than th y
at present possess. It seems to me to be both premature and somewhat ill-omened
to attempt to-day to lay down a plan for the administration of Mesopotamia, for it is my
intimate conviction that, unless the dangers which now threaten us in that quarter are
faced in time, there will in another twelvemonth be no question of our administering
Mesopotamia at all. ^
May 24, 1920.

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Content

The file contains correspondence, minutes, memoranda, and reports concerning the administration of Mesopotamia and other Middle Eastern territories and the transfer of responsibility for Middle Eastern Affairs to a new department within the Colonial Office. Authors and correspondents include Curzon himself, members of the Cabinet, officials from the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , Foreign Office, Colonial Office, Air Staff, Imperial General Staff, and High Commission in Baghdad.

Extent and format
1 file (68 folios)
Arrangement

The file is arranged in chronological order from the front to the back.

Physical characteristics

Foliation: the foliation sequence (used for referencing) commences at the first folio with 1, and terminates at the last folio with 68; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio. An additional foliation sequence is present in parallel between ff 1-68; these numbers are also written in pencil, but are not circled.

Pagination: the file also contains an original printed pagination sequence.

Written in
English in Latin script
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'Papers relating to transfer of Middle Eastern Affairs to the Colonial Office and creation of a new Department there, 1920-1921, with Cabinet notes of Milner, Montague, Churchill, self, and others' [‎18r] (35/136), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F112/281, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100076639645.0x000024> [accessed 28 March 2024]

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