Ext 5000/47/1 'Persian situation: miscellaneous reports' [‎73r] (146/704)

OUTWARD TELEGRAM
^ 'j-'
o
Sr. v
[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be
^-retained by the authoilsed recipient and not passed on].
Cypher/OTP
^ 5116/100/34.
Secret.
POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION.
FROM FQRLICrN OFFICL TO i,*lRAN.
No. 154.
16th March, 1946.
Repeate
SECRET.
D. 6.30 p.m. 16th March, 1948.
Repeated to Washington No. 2988 and Saving to Moscow No. 258, and
B.M.E.O. Cairo No. 73.
Addressed to Tehran telegram No. 154 of the 16th March ,
repeated for information to Washington and Saving to Moscow and
British Middle East Office, Cairo.
Li».
Your telegram No. 191 [of 4th March:
Situation in Persia].
Items 2 and 3 of the Shah's project of constitutional reform
amount to a substantial increase in the royal prerogatives
even if the provision about martial law is deleted. For
instance the provision that the Shah is to appoint and dismiss
officers appears bo oe a new right and therefore to represent a
real increase in-his powers. The provision about the aopoint-
ment and dismissal oi civil officials of high rank leaves out the
of the Supplementary Constitutional Law
that the Sovereign s action needs the approval of the responsible
Minister. As regards the dissolution proposal it is oerhaps
worth pointing out that the Majlis, whatever its faults in
ome affairs, does act as a focus of national sentiment in matters
? ol u G ? • for example tho Soviet-Persian Oil Agreement)
and the fact that it cannot be dissolved strengthens its
position as a bulwark of national independance. Moreover if
at some future date a foreign Government desires something which
the Majlis is not prepared to grant and the Shah has the right
lt h i mi P ht , find himself under very heavy pressure
f hat po ]fr r to dissolve the Majlis, whereas at present he is
involved 1130 ^ intlaeriGe behlna th c scenes without being formally
+ . The Shah 1 imagine, well aware of all the above
onsid-rauions except possibly the last, and I take his request
or my comments uo mean that he wants me to apnrove his going
ahead with some scheme to increase his prerogatives. g g
n ^his I cannot do. I am most apprehensive of the crenernl
'auiaUi eff f cts + °f an attera ? t by the Shah to increase his g
V^PreK-^tives (my telegr am No. 887[of 24 th November, 1947]) and I
thTh t ^ Lnk „ tha ? if he makc^The~attempt he' :a~ay be playing iMT
the hands of subversive elements in hii own comitrO Nor am T
convinced that in the interests of reform an inSe in the
royal prerogative has yet been proved necessary. I still see no
(repeat no) evidence that the Shah and his Government are making
/a really determined
<A