Ext 5000/47/1 'Persian situation: miscellaneous reports' [‎296r] (595/704)

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Tnis telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient
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From Moscow to Foreiyn Office
Sir M. Peterson
(No. 642)
L'^iit
7L. March, 1947
Received 1-55 a.m. 8th March, 1947
Persia
In the course of a long conversation with
the Minister last night the Persian Ambas
sador set out his views on future develop
ments in Persia, which he hoped to have
an opportunity to put before Mr. Bevin on
his arrival in Moscow.
2. Firouz insisted that he had always
been against all foreign, including Russian,
intervention in Persia, and claimed that we
had been wrong in regarding Qawam last
year as a Russian puppet. I think he
wished us to infer that we should be equally
wrong to take the same view not [sicj
about himself. He claimed that it would
have been impossible to take action in
Azerbaijan or in regard to the Tudeh any
earlier. Apart from international develop
ments, which had greatly aided Qawam,
time had been needed to reveal the inca
pacity of Pishevari and his friends in
Azerbaijan and of the Tudeh throughout
Persia.
3. Firouz admitted that he had been very
much surprised by the mildness of Soviet
reactions to their set-back in Persia,
although he had been worried by the tone
of the lecture reported in my telegram
No. 428 . In his conversations with Soviet
officials they had expressed anxiety lest
Persian reactionaries might now take the
bit between their teeth, tear up the old
concession, and even revive old Persian
claims for former Persian territory now in
the Soviet Union. Firouz said that there
was a good deal of talk in Tehran on such
lines, but he had given the Russians his
personal assurance, supported, the Minister
gathered, by that of Qawam that the oil
concession would be ratified and that
Persian hotheads would be kept in check.
He would not remain in Moscow a single
day if he thought there was any danger of
the Majlis going back upon the oil conces
sion. He had, however, warned the
Russians that the concession must be drawn
up and operated in a way fully compatible
with Persian sovereignty and indepen
dence. In these conversations the Russians
had shown themselves really anxious, and
there had been no hint of bluster or threats.
4. Firouz added that he was himself
strongly recommending the simultaneous
grant of an oil concession in Eastern Persia
to the Americans, as he saw safety for
Persia in all three Great Powers having
similar interests there.
5. Firouz then developed a personal idea
that Persian independence might be
guaranteed by a Three-Power Agreement
signed by ourselves, the Americans and the
Russians. This would, he suggested, turn
Persia into 4 ' a Switzerland of the East ”
and should, he thought, meet our own
requirements which were presumably a
genuinely independent Persia and the
maintenance of our oil interests. He
admitted that he had been sceptical about
the Russians welcoming such an idea, but
he had been encouraged by two recent
conversations he had had in Moscow with
[group undecypherable ? Lewis] Saillant.
He had told Saillant that the mistake of
the Russians, of Tudeh, and by implication
of the W.F.T.U., had been to leave the
impression that Soviet intervention in
Persian internal affairs was normal and
natural. He had suggested to Saillant
that the report of the W.F.T.U. Commis
sion should emphasise the necessity for all
Powers, including specifically the Russians,
to abstain from such intervention and
should then suggest something on the lines
of Firouz’s proposal for a Three-Power
Agreement. At first talk Saillant had been
sympathetic but non-committal. He re
turned a day or two later welcoming the
idea so enthusiastically that Firouz was
confident that Saillant had consulted the
Russians meanwhile and that it might have
their support.
6. Firouz also spoke about the necessity
for adapting our methods and choosing our
personnel in Persia to meet changed cir
cumstances. In this connexion he spoke
highly of Mr. Audsley for the help he had
given over labour questions. Firouz ex
pressed confidence that if we moved with
the times there was a bright future for
Anglo-Persian co-operation.
7. In reply to a question, Firouz said
that he was confident that Stalin as a
Georgian took a specially close personal
interest in Persian affairs. Stalin had once
spent some time in Tabriz to escape the
Tsarist police and he still tended to
approach Persian problems in terms of the
situation immediately after the Russian
revolution.
8. Firouz said the Pishevari had recently
been seen near Baku, but claimed that the
Russians were for the time-being dis
illusioned in him.
Repeated to Tehran and Washington.]
13222-499 33230-19