File 200/1928 Pt 8 'Anglo-Persian Negotiations' [‎80r] (164/1096)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOYERNMENT
PERSIA.
CONFIDENTIAL.
' ^ '/
July 4, 1933.
Section 1.
OS 3625/1329/34]
No. 1.
Mr. Mallett to Sir John Simon.—{Received July 4.)
(No. 294.)
Sir, Gulhek, June 17, 1933.
IN the course of an interview on the 15th June with the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, our conversation turned to the general question of Anglo-Persian
relations. I had been urging his Highness to make haste and remove such
stumbling-blocks as are presented by the Townshend-Smith and Parsons cases,
in order that we might be in a position to profit by the improved atmosphere
created by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company Agreement. I opined that he would
have received reports from the Persian Legation in London during the winter
to the effect that feeling there was by no means too amiable towards Persia. 1
had been in London then myself, and I could personally assure his Highness that
this was the case. Evidently the successful issue of Sir John Cadman’s visit had
now produced a much more favourable state of public opinion in the United
Kingdom. As an instance, I produced a copy of the Times leading article of the
1st June, which I was rather surprised to find Feroughi had already read.
2. The Minister said that he recognised that a great and most pleasant
change had been brought about by the oil agreement. The Shah himself was now
most benevolently disposed towards Great Britain, and we must all do our best
to profit by this mood while it lasted. I answered that His Majesty’s Minister
had fully realised this, and that he much hoped that when he returned in the
autumn the outstanding questions between the two Governments would be quickly
settled. Feroughi said that the treaty negotiations ought not to prove too
difficult, now that the question of the oil, which had been a real grievance with
Persia, was out of the way. I expressed the hope that the Shah would give orders
that the negotiations must be pursued diligently; in that case, perhaps a week’s
hard work, day and night in the Cadman style, would produce a final result.
Feroughi laughingly agreed that we should have to try this method.
3. His Highness then related to me his view of the history of our relations
since that baleful year 1907. He knew that there were reasons of high policy
for our agreement with Russia; he admitted that the Russians had not played
the game under the agreement. The fact remained, however, that the British
had then lost many of their friends and had never regained them since. Then
came the war, and then that “ blunder of Lord Curzon’s,” the abortive agreement
of 1919. We could have obtained almost all our desiderata without any written
document. The instrument itself, and even more the way in which we attempted
to impose it upon the country, had done us infinite damage. At the very moment
when the agreement was being secretly negotiated in Tehran a Persian delegation,
of which he himself was a member, was refused admission to the Paris Peace
Conference. Since then, no doubt, there had been an improvement, due in great
measure to the wisdom and tact of Sir Percy Loraine, but the oil question had
rankled and prevented complete reconciliation. Feroughi even hinted that this
had been a reason for the utter lack of finality in the long-drawn-out treaty
negotiations.
4. His Highness repeated to me w T hat he said he had often told Sir Percy
Loraine, namely, that the interests of our two countries were alike, and that by
nature we were designed to be friends. It was only the British errors in
diplomacy since 1907 which had engendered suspicion of our motives. I
answered that whatever errors there might have been, our real policy towards
Persia had for many years past remained constant. It was clearly in our interest
that Persia should be strong and independent. Even the ill-fated agreement of
1919 had onlv this object in view, although I admitted there was force in
Ferouo-hi’s criticisms of it. Anyhow, the time had surel\ come to bui\ the past
and make a fresh start from the date of the new oil concession. The best way
[859 d—1]