File 200/1928 Pt 8 'Anglo-Persian Negotiations' [‎330r] (666/1096)

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S GOYERNMENT
Printed for the Cabinet. October 1932.
CONFIDENTIAL.
y
J.P. 358 (32).
Copy No. j O
CABINET.
E 5481/208/34]
A X G LO-PER SIA X RELATIONS.
Al the ( abinet of the 19th October I was asked to circulate an appreciation
of the piesent position of our relations with Persia. The followino' memorandum
has been prepared accordingly :—
1. Negotiations have been in progress with Persia for several years for the
conclusion or a general treaty settlement to regularise Anglo-Persian relations.
^ has always been contemplated that such a settlement would provide
(a) tor the continued use by the British navy of the Persian Island of Hen jam for
{imposes of refuelling and recreation; and (b) for the renunciation by Persia of
the antiquated claim which she had put forward to the islands of Bahrein, which
constitute an independent sheikhdom, under British protection, off the Arabian
coast of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. .
3. The foreign Office consider a general settlement with Persia, if it can
ie secured, politically desirable (a) because, in its absence, our relations with
ersia are likely to deteriorate, and there are, in any case, obvious objections to
out being on bad terms with any country with which we have so many points of
contact; (6) with a view to avoiding friction with Persia in the strategically
important area of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. where international friction might lead to
embarrassing consequences; (c) in order that Persia may not fall completely
within the Russian orbit, with consequent danger to British interests in India,
111 an d in the Middle East generally; and (d) in order that our important
nested interests in Persia, and more particularly the Anglo-Persian Oil Company
-the satisfactory working of which is of great Imperial importance—may not be
subjected to retaliatory action. (With regard to (d), it may be explained that,
although it is to the interest of the Persians themselves that the Anglo-Persian
1 Company should be allowed to operate freely and prosperously, it is impossible
0 iely on the Persians, in their present frame of mind, acting in their own best
interests.)
4. A further reason for reaching an early agreement with Persia, if
possible, is that, if Anglo-Persian relations seriously deteriorate at this moment,
p probably be impossible to secure the conclusion of the proposed Anglo-
eiso-Iraqi Convention for the conservancy of the Shatt-el-Arab. A satisfactory
s ett ement of this question is of great importance to British shipping, to British
Cade with Iraq, and to the British military forces which will be stationed in Iraq
under the new Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930.
Che two outstanding difficulties in the way of the conclusion of a treaty
se tiement are Henjam and Bahrein.
6. As regards Henjam, the Persians, in two notes of the 19th September
Tf ( i!^ e September, have formally demanded our evacuation of the island.
this demand is persisted in it will be impossible to resist it, and it will be
necessary for His Majesty’s Government to spend immediately some £40,000 on
/n preparation of an alternative station at Bahrein, which is at present, in an\
^nse, claimed by Persia, though we do not admit the claim. This expenditure
nitp, moreover, have to be greatly increased if Bahrein is to be made suitable foi
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