File 200/1928 Pt 8 'Anglo-Persian Negotiations' [‎330v] (667/1096)

light cruisers. The Service Departments agree that, if Hen jam i s t h
evacuated, an alternative must be found in the Gulf, and that Bahrein i s the° |
possible one.
7. As regards Bahrein, there is reason to believe that the Shah h
committed himself personally to the prosecution of this claim—frivolous thou4
it may seem —and that, unless some “ face-saving ” device or appareik
“compensation ” can be found, it will be impossible for the Persian Governmm
to abandon it.
8. If sufficient “compensation' could be offered to Persia, it is possible
that both our main desiderata, i.e., continued use of Henjam and the renunciation
of the Persian claim to Bahrein, could be secured. The concessions which we
have hitherto offered to Persia do not appear to be sufficient to secure these objects
and, indeed, it would be difficult to convince the Persian Government that their
real value is even approximately as great as we have sought to represent it.
9. His Majesty's Minister at Tehran has suggested that the Persian claim
to Bahrein is now the main difficulty, and that, if this could be cleared out of the
way, we might still secure what we need at Henjam and a general settlement on
the lines we desire. This view, incidentally, is shared by Sir Francis Humphrys.
who had opportunities of discussing matters with Teymourtache at Tehran last
spring and with the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs at Geneva a few weeks
ago, and who is well qualified to form an opinion.
10. Three courses of action now appear to be possible: —
(а) To threaten a rupture of negotiations if our minimum desiderata are
not conceded.
(б) To offer the Persians a still higher price for what we want.
(c) To dispose of the Persian claim to Bahrein by some other means, in the
hope that a settlement of Henjam and the other questions outstanding
may thus be facilitated.
11. —(«) It may well be argued, from the Persian Government's unsatis
factory An East India Company trading post. record during the negotiations, that their one object is to extract by hard
bargaining the last possible concession from His Majesty’s Government, and that,
in order to reach a treaty settlement at all, it will be essential to inform them
bluntly that this process must come to an end, that His Majesty's Government
have reached the utmost limit of concession, and that, if Persia is unwilling to
give His Majesty's Government what they want in return for what they haw
already offered, there is no object in negotiating further. If there were good
reason to hope that this course of action might bring the Persians to the point
of concluding the treaty, the Foreign Office would be strongly in favour of taking
a firm line with the Persian Government in this sense without delay. If the
Persians persist in their demand for our evacuation of Henjam, such a couise
may, indeed, be inevitable. The Foreign Office, however, feel that the Persian
Government, unfortunately, attach so little importance to the concessions hitherto
offered to them by His Majesty's Government that a threat to break off negotm
tions is unlikely to lead to the conclusion of a settlement, and that, if it has to *
made, it will probably have to be carried out. in spite of the dangers allude 0
in paragraphs 3 and 4 above.
12. —(6) The possibility of offering further concessions to Persia has a ! rea ^,
been considered. Suggestions have been made for the offer to Persia 0 .
of desert country at the north-west corner of British Baluchistan. This has
vetoed by the Government of India. The Persians have asked for the - _
Islands of Tamb and Abu Musa (which they also claim), but these won
to be purchased or leased, at a large price or rent, from their present Ara ^
who would probably be unwilling in any case to give them up and coul .
forced to do so. The supply to Persia on specially favourable terms of ^
or aircraft has proved impracticable for financial reasons and °) un 7 0 re al
precedent it would create. The waiver of the war and post-war debt 18
concession from the Persian Government’s point of view, as they do h? , a jj
this debt and never intend to repay it. The Treasury have long aban
hope of recovering it.