File 7251/1920 Pt 3 'Arabia: Situation and Policy; Agenda for Inter Departmental Committee Meetings' [‎215v] (67/268)

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recently Bin Jilovi had occasion to order a Shiah inhabitant of Hoffuf to be beaten t
death for cursing in public Bin Sand, the Ikhwan and the religion of the Ikhwu 0
The execution caused great resentment among Hassa Shiahs. At the same time J 1 '
fairness to Bin Jilovi, it may be recounted that during the same week he ordered’an
Akh to be executed in exactly the same way for being caught seducing a married
woman. In Qatif, owing to the behaviour of certain Ikhwan, who have demanded that
Shiahs should cease theii leadings (Qaraiyas) in their Ilusseiniyehs, much resentment
exists against the Ikhwans. The Emir, Abdur Rahman Bin Swelum, has returned
iiom Riyadh, and his strong arm may be trusted to keep things quiet. It is possible
the Qatif Shiahs, who are adepts at making mischief, may present a memorial to this
i\gency detailing their wrongs. I trust they do not.
'• turn to i 5 in &aua ana his enemies. Undoubtedly he fears Shammar
Zubair, Koweit and Jlejaz he despises, though he knows how dangerous are their
intrigues. For all his recent talk about attacking Koweit, it may be taken as certain
that he will do no such thing. Firstly, he knows he would be up against us and
realises that His Majesty s Government cannot stand still and see Koweit become n
province of Bin Sand. Personally, I am not sure but that it would not be one of the
soundest bits of po icy we could adopt to let Bin Sand over-run and conquer it much
as he dm Hassa It would once and for all settle the Bin Rashid question and make
i i? ® auc the dominant factor m Arabia. As this is not a likely contingencv it
behoves us to look round and see what line Bin Sand is likely to take. That he must
act and act within the next two or three months is certain.
Two courses are open to Bin Saud : —
11) Open war with Bin Rashid and his friends.
(2) lo gain his object over Bin Rashid by diplomatic action.
I do not think he will adopt. (1), as the risks to his empire in case of defeat are
in°summer ^heT'’ 8 ‘T dll l? Cnlt succ ff ul operation against Bin Rashid would be
m mmei. Theie is not a well or waterhole anywhere throughout Shammar territory
winch has not got a party of Ilashidite scouts sitting on it. The element of surprise
s therefore from the start denied Bin Saud. Ordinary raids, which are always fpen
to him, Will not accomplish much. In fact, in this game Bin Rashid would probaUv
die best. Shammar are united with the exception of those Bedouins who have turned
or Shammar ^ the 0t , her ha " d ’ - » suitable fieid
as enemies. 31 g ’ d ralders from the Ilort,1 would not necessarily be received
noteKereThat BinTd (2) 1 is r * e line Bin Saud will adopt. It should he
He is capable of mnhhi' d raatters . diplomatic is without rival throughout Arabia,
tie rs capable of making rings round Bin Rashid in this respect. His bluff candid
befoTn^^TheAnaTaTYfrV 0 aCt *i! lS coverf ° r one ° f astutest brains that can
^y and aecom^lTs^ndl nk ’ arethe ~ ^ which Bin Saud is most likely to
claimi^thfs’basir'^IW is Jau / al Amr ' c , From tim e immemorial the Anazah have
has made them verv iZ fif re of U aud their Huai ejection by Bin Rashid
and an appeTfroF^m uUf ain t k hamm - r - It Saud . is himself of Anazah stock,
rich Jauf lands and assisti U ° . p . ln vai11 - M hat easier than to offer Anazah the
in return to be recou Id b .‘ft he lP la g *em get it ? Bin Saud will only demand
Governor at Hail With Sh^ e nazah a8 overlor(1 of Bin Rashid with a Saudite
neither Koweit nor Heiaz willTe^ of a ac | k ® cl 1 from Dortl1 an< i south simultaneously,
with Hail could be stonnorl it n mucll 1 he P- In fa ct, in such a war Koweit trade
Ajman would be sufficient for the^ur^se! 7 ^ CUttlUg tl ’ ade r ° llteS * The Mlltair ° r
ment^o^ee BrntSiTonc^m “ W ° uld to the interest of His Majesty’s Govern-
Central Arabia u^ BirSaiir"'1 h VaSSal ^ ? ” . 1 think ^ would. A strong
Government, would, I venture Vrwhi aks .^2 t . e ^ v ^iendly terms with the British
would solve manv difficulties ami it * kiatlslj 1 P ollc y down to the ground. It
much more dependent on us thn J /i enta make a d the small coastal States very
Oman, Yemen^Hejaz! and even S^ r Koweit > Bahrein, Trucial Coast A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. ,
neighbour, and would be mnro-n ^ t t ’ ^ 0ll fd a B h\e in terror of their powerful
than they are to-day 4t the ° \! e ' vls ^ les of His Majesty’s Government
Great War and muih b Ik ofT “ uf’ f the , s 1 e coastal States, ash result of the
talk of the rights of small nations,” have, so to speak, got