File 1355/1917 Pt 6 'Arms Traffic Convention: revised convention, 1925' [‎479v] (965/1226)

4
efforts, Greece feels bound to subordinate here acceptance of such a convention to the
certainty of being able to ensure her own security in all circumstances.
Moreover, without prejudice to any observations which we may be led to make
during the course of the discussion, the Greek delegation feels bound to point out
certain specially important questiorts at the present moment.
If the convention is accepted as it now stands, it will put the minor Powers -ji
who are already very unfavourably situated, in an even worse situation than they
are at present, because it will create a sort of condominium of the Great Powers
which produce arms, munitions and war material as compared with the smaller and
non-producing countries. The latter will be placed under a sort of tutelage of the
Great Powers, and be at their mercy, for they will be compelled to accept the
economic or political conditions which may be imposed upon them. Moreover, the
secrets of the national defence of the smaller non-producing Powers will necessarily
be divulged, whereas, the great producing Powers will be able to maintain the most
absolute secrecy.
Now, the principle on which the League of Nations is based is that of equality,
but this convention disregards that principle and is based upon inequality. The
inevitable result of this initial defect will turn against the League of Nations itself,
for the smaller, non-producing countries will be forced to become producers of war
material in order to escape from this political and economic pressure and from the
unilateral obligations of publicity with regard to their armaments. The result will
be a multiplication of factories producing war material, and that will tend towards
an increase of armaments.
Greece is perfectly ready to sign a convention which is based on principles of
equality and justice. I am convinced that this conference will never unanimously
accept any convention which tends to disarm the non-producing countries before
questions of security and general disarmament have been settled.
I trust that none of the delegates will see in these observations any ulterior
intention hostile to the objects of the conference. On the contrary, in making these
declarations, the Greek delegation is merely performing a duty of sincerity towards
the conference, feeling sure that this cannot fail to assist in the attainment of the
great cause for which the League of Nations has laboured so unremittingly during
the past five years.
M. HENNINGS (Sweden) (translation) : The Swedish Government has
throughout co-operated in the sincerest manner with other nations in the effort to
arrive at positive results in the field of the reduction of armaments. The aim of
this conference is to prepare a convention which in a certain degree affects this great
and primary question. It is therefore with great satisfaction that the Swedish
Government felt able to accept the invitation to take part in this confmence.
The problem of establishing control over the international traffic in arms,
munitions and implements of war has for some time past been the subject of careful
examination by the different organs of the League of Nations, and, in particular, by
the Temporary Mixed Commission. It is hardly necessary for me to remind the
conference that the late M. Branting, my illustrious compatriot, took an active part
in the elaboration of the draft convention which is now before us. This draft is
based on two fundamental principles. It establishes a system of licences and a con
siderable measure of publicity as regards the import and export of arms. Asa
matter of fact, a system of licences which is fairly rigorous has already been apph e(i
in Sweden, and it therefore follows that the general extension of such a reguno
cannot arouse any opposition from the Swedish Government.
As regards the system of publicity which is provided by the draft convention
we must recognise that it will have a very unequal effect as regards the deliveries o
arms to the military forces of the different countries. Those nations which do no
possess national arms industries will find that all the arms which they import, ne
matter how necessary they may be to the security of their countries, are made e
subject of publicity, whereas the great producing countries will be able to proeun 3
the arms that they require without public opinion being informed about that matter
Similarly, countries in which the arms industry, which is indispensable for ^
national defence, depends to a great extent on the possibility of finding markets i
time of peace will find themselves in a very much more exposed position from
effects of this publicity than countries in which the home market is sufficiently l ar o
to absorb the output without recourse being had to exportation. , j e
Perhaps it would have been better, in view of these considerations, for the v
problem of publicity in regard to the armaments of nations to be solved in a co

File 1355/1917 Pt 6 'Arms Traffic Convention: revised convention, 1925' [‎479v] (965/1226)

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File 1355/1917 Pt 6 'Arms Traffic Convention: revised convention, 1925' [‎479v] (965/1226)

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